>> tuesday, your chance to talk to the authors of the best-selling "game change." mark halperin and john hillman take your questions on the impact of the book of washington politics and policy live tuesday morning on c-span's washington journal. >> and now the state of the state address from georgia's governor, sonny perdue, as he sprs his final year in office, he reflects on his seven years as governor and talks about issues including mental health care spending and his proposal to change the way pay raises are awarded t thers. from the state capitol in atlanta, this is about half an hour. [applause] >> thank you, all. thank you so much. mr. speaker and mr. president, president pro tem williams and speaker pro tem jones -- how does that sound? [laughter] members of the general assembly,

members of how judiciary, to the consulate core and to other distinguishes guests, and most of all to my fellow georgians, let me begin by congratulating the new speaker of the house, new speaker pro tem. i've always enjoyed our past relationships, and i look forward to working with you both this year. i want to thank you all very kindly for that very kind resolution. the i would like to get a copy of the vote count. [laughter] you know, as previous governors i've used this address to talk about the budget, policy issues and to roll out my legislative agenda can. you're probably wondering why there isn't a budget lying on your desks this morning. well, actually it's really

there, it's just very thin. [laughter] this year's message will be different, so let me apologize to you and to the press corps in advance. but, frankly, i believe it's much bigger than a budget document. the encouragement that i want to offer goes can beyond numbers on a page and beyond line items in a bill and to the very core of why we're here and what we're called to do. i hope you'll grant me that privilege today as i make this last lap around the track. first off and before i talk about the tasks that lie ahead, i want to recognize the one earthly person who has stood out as my inspiration and guide throughout this the -- journey. i think you may know who i'm talking about. mary, i'm not sure i've ever told you this before, but you're the person that i hope to

become. your kindness and gentleness have not only comforted me in these 37 years, they've changed me. you've been a constant reminder of our purpose in public office, and i thank you for all that you've done as my loving wife and the first lady of georgia. i love you, thank you. [applause] >> some of you may recall at my first state of the state address we decided to leave a seat in the gallery empty to represent

the children of georgia who had no one to speak for them. and for the last seven years mary perdue has been that voice. by launching the our children campaign she has united and empowered individuals, organizations, corporations and faith-based groups as they touch the face of children in their local community. to my children and grandchildren in the audience today, words cannot express my gratitude the for your patience and love and support over these past not only seven years, but many years. you've probably heard me tell the story many of the folks have heard me tell the story about our sharing one another's reputation just like we do here in the capital toll. but -- capitol. but i tell this story because it happens to be true. when i was first elected to the state senate, i sat our children

down and told them that, reminded them that we shared one another's reputation. in fact, i told them that there are things they could do at home that would make me be embarrassed to go to atlanta and serve, and that there are things that i could do in atlanta that would make them embarrassed to go to school at home. kids, you need to know you've never embarrassed me. i'm sorry i may have 'em parissed you from time to time -- embarrassed you from time to time, but you've never embraced me, and -- embarrassed me, and i love you so much for all that. [applause] for seven years it's been my highest honor to work with those of you in this chamber and to represent our almost nearly ten million georgians. we've been through a lot together. in that time we've sent our young georgia men and women to

the fight in battle in afghanistan and iraq. and some of them have not come home. and we've seen the worst drought on record. and in an economy as difficult as any of us can ever remember in our generation going back to the 1930s. you don't need me today to tell you that the challenge before us is real, but we can rest in the knowledge that america has seen these times before. just over a year ago as my fellow governors and i gathered with our newly-elected president in philadelphia, i sat in the chambers of our nation's first capitol at congress, congress hall. and my mind couldn't help but wandering back to those earliest days of our nation and to the founding fathers. there in those hallowed surroundings i couldn't help but

reflect on their courage and their optimism in the face of ultimate uncertainty. their hope was against all odds, but it was the, their spirit that the time demanded of them. think back to the early months of revolutionary war, if you will, with me. we know that families from savannah to boston had begin their father -- given their fathers and sons to the american cause can. and it is, as it is with war, as it is today many of them would never return to their homes. general george washington and his army faced seemingly insurmountable odds. it was cold, his men were ill equipped and outmatched. it was then on december the 23rd, 1776, only two days before that pivotal battle of trenton that washington sought to

inspire his small volunteer army by reading aloud from thomas paine's powerful work, the pamphlet "crisis." today we can read the words that ragged band of revolutionaries heard that day in 1776. these are the times that try men's souls, but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman, and we have this consolation with us that the heart of the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. sure of their cause, they pressed on to victory, and thus began the long, rich history of our nation. those early days, however, were not the darkest and most uncurve kern days our -- uncertain days our nation would see. years later, as we all know, the

descendants of those revolutionary heros would face each other, sometimes brother against brother, fighting over the future and direction of our growing nation. the early 20th century brought war on a scale that was never before witnessed by mankind. 70 million soldiers, 70 million soldiers took up arms in a conflict of lethal artillery and machine guns, trench warfare and poison gas. and almost six million of those soldiers would lose their lives in defense of freedom. in the misery and cold, in the muddy trenches along the western front america held strong. the 1930s brought a great depression, a global downturn so severe that one out of every four able-bodied americans was out of work.

just recently at the southern governors' 75th anniversary at warm springs i was reminded of how deeply the depression affected southern families and how long it took our region to fully emerge from that time. a decade later america would join a world war in a fight against total thetarianism and hatred, at an unfathomable cost. america answers the call, persevered and emerged stronger still. an international defender of liberty, individual freedom and liberty. but two world wars weren't the end of our trials in the 20th century. in korea and vietnam, america would lose more than 90,000 soldiers. and while thousands of young men and women fought in dark jungles around the world, there was another war at home, a war within the national conscious as

america strived ever closer to liberty and justice for all. that struggle, as we well know, was led by brave georgians just simply blocks from here. our nation's story unfolding through the centuries gives us some much-needed perspective about where we are and what we face today. it teaches us that each generation has faced their own trial and shouldered their own respondent. they've faced -- responsibility. they've faced every enemy and bore every cost in their resolve to create a better nation for their children and grandchildren. what stands out most to me is each generation's willingness to pick up the yolk and move our nation forward. it has not always been pretty, but what has never happened before in this nation is for the

one generation to drop the yoke and wait for the next to pick it up, and neither have they weighted them down with unbearable burdens. friends, colleagues, georgians, this is our time to carry a heavy load, to do the hard thing now for the sake of our children and grandchildren. for our generation the economic storm we now find ourselves in is unlike anything we've seen. these are hard time thes for georgians, many of our friends and neighbors have lost their jobs, and others are working harder and longer for less. and, yes, all of our checkbooks are harder to balance. here in this chamber this time has forced tough decisions on all of us. you know, we spent the first six years of our administration before this recession even began

doing our best to make government more responsive, more efficient, more value-driven. and then came the biggest state revenue drop since the great depression. together we've worked hard to find the best solutions, and we've asked our state team members throughout our state for more in an effort to maintain the services with fewer resources. but, ladies and gentlemen, if we fail to do the hard thing now, our government will be spread far too thin to insure that georgia is more educated, healthier, safer and continues to grow. it would be easy to sit back and, as we sometimes do, point fingers at washington. but even here in georgia we must remind ourselves that we need to avoid the temptation to serve the needs and wants of today at the expense of tomorrow.

we must reject the course that promises the next generation little more than an expensive bill crushing entitlements and unfunded mandates. we cannot vote ourselves ease and comfort at the expense of our children and grandchildren. alexis d.topel said it well, frightenly almost prophetically almost 200 years ago he wrote, a democracy can only exist from when the voters discover that the majority votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the treasury. with the result of the democracy always collapses over lousy fiscal policy. always followed by a dictatorship. the average of the world's great citizenships before they,

civilizations before they decline has been about 200 years. these nations have progressed in this sequence. listen closely to the sequence. from bondage to spiritual faith, from faith to great courage, from counselor to liberty -- counselor to liberty, from liberty to abundance, from abundance to selfishness, from selfishness to complacency, from complacency to ap apathy, from apathy to dependency, from dependency back again to bondage. there's never been a cautionary tale so well suited to a time and place as this one is to america today here and now. i also love the story that thomas payne recounted from the days of the american revolution. he told of a tavern keeper from amboy who happened to be a closet torre, a people for whom

thomas payne had little respect. and he describes the scene. he was standing in his door with his pretty child in his hand about 8 or 9 years old as i ever saw. and after speaking his mind as freely as he thought was prudent, finished with this unfatherly expression. well, give me peace in my day, give me peace in my day. thomas payne goes on to say that a loving parent should have said if there must be trouble, let it be in my day that my child may have peace. and payne is right. this single reflection well applied is sufficient to awaken every man to duty. we, today, in this house, in the people's house, in this place and in georgia, we must recover the spirit of that are loving

sacrificing father. i believe i stand with most georgians who when i say i am for doing with a little less if it means a lighter burden and a brighter future for the next generation. there's an honor in sacrifice -- [applause] there is an honor in sacrifice, and we must never pervert it into the disdain of dissatisfaction. i've talked a lot over the last few years about building a culture of conservation here in georgia using only what we need and being better stewards of our natural resources. at its core that culture of conservation is a simple call to be satisfied with only what we truly need, and it extends to every aspect of our lives.

going forward may we pledge ourselves to forego the excesses of our time and reject the gluttonous instinct of this age. these time thes demand that we worry less about bringing home the pork and more about empowering our own people to grow their own hogs. these time thes call for -- time thes call for true leadership in our community, calling people to create a better georgia, elevating them out of the easy way of dependency. we have to call on every georgia to build rather than consume, to give rather than to take, and we must begin that transformation here in this place and with our own severals. selves. when i was sworn into my second term, i said that the only legacy i sought was the same one that i believe any parent or grandparent sees, to hand off our state, our home to the next

generation in better shape than we found it. we now find ourselves at a moment in history in which we must do the hard thing now to insure that the future is bright for them. and we can do none of this, none of this without one another. instead of creating an environment of political posturing and blame casting, we've got the opportunity to join hands and hearts and work together republican and democrat, rural and urban, experienced veterans and energetic newcomers. we know that governing is a team sport, and we're all members of team georgia. you know, you come here to the capitol each january from every corner of the state elected by the distinct constituencies that sometimes have very little in common. and together we form a patchwork

quilt with our beliefs, our ideas and our personalities. that diversity demands a true commitment to cooperation. i think of marriage, and i remember the passage of how apostle paul exhorted those the church, the husbands and wives in marriage when he called them to mutual respect, to put away focus on self and to submit to one another for the common good. and those truths have application far beyond marriage. they count here in this place. the people who send us here expect us to work together for the good of our great state of georgia. georgians didn't elect us to watch a rug by match with a scrum on every decision. when we don't work together, what we don't know is our

jerseys get so muddied that the people can't even distinguish which team we're on, and it just means we all come out with mud on our faces. the folks back home have sprussed us to -- entrusted us to put aprils and progress -- principles and progress over partisanship, and they've asked us to do the hard thing now for the future of this state. and that means drilling down into every area of government to literally redefine our responsibilities and commitments going forward. we have to take this mind set and apply it to every corner, every crevasse of state government, e crevasse. for too long the easy answer in some parts for education, for instance, have been to preserve the status quo. the prevailing winds have often forced us to accept watered-down compromises that, frankly, just nibble around the edges.

that change began two years ago, it began to change two years ago when you courageously passed our ie squared legislation. systems around the state are being freed from state mandates bringing innovative thinking into their schools while committing contractually to measure and commit to student improvement. this radical move forward in education policy is already producing results. yesterday morning i outlined a proposal that would tie teacher pay to student achievement. some will defend the status quo, but it's hard for me to believe that tying performance to pay is anything other than common sense in america. ladies and gentlemen, many young people today, frankly, have the idea that the salary ceiling is too low to even consider going into teaching, and we know that to be the case.

that perception effectively shuts out many of the best and brightest, literally shuts them out of our classrooms. teachers have told us overwhelmingly in a survey that they would welcome being evaluated based on observation of their teaching and the growth of their students academically. let's make the commitment now to align our compensation with the mission of our schools. let's do it for our teachers, let's do it for our students, and let's do it for all the people of georgia. i look forward to -- [applause] i look forward to working with you on this unique opportunity to drive student achievement for the foreseeable future. as we rethink the appropriate role of government in these times, we cannot retreat from

our duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves. i am convinced that georgia can, georgia must and georgia will adequately care for the citizens in our state's mental health program even though it's been a daunting challenge that precedes my time as governor. we will do this. [applause] we took a major step forward last year in creating an agency whose sole focus is caring for the mentally challenged and the developmentally disabled. with a respected mental health professional leading this agency, we have developed a plan that will stabilize hospital staffing and improve care in our institutions. yes, it will cost more money, but i am confident that the additional investment will result in better outcomes for patients and will enable all of

us to sleep better at night. i want to be clear, my interest is not driven purely by legal mandates. in fact, i'm somewhat embarrassed it may have, it's come to that. but from my own personal belief we have a moral obligation to serve those with disabilities. they are our mothers and fathers, our sons and daughters, our neighbors. and, yes, we are our brother's keepers. that obligation should carry a tangible effort. it's a hard thing to do in these budget times. the budgets that i will release on friday will include an additional investment of $20 million in this year, 2010, and over $50 million in the next fiscal year of additional investment. together we are making concerted efforts to do the right thing for this vulnerable population. i ask for your continued support

as well as that of those consumers, providers, advocates, families and communities to help us develop a system of care of which we can be proud. we've already faced tough decisions with respect to our team of state employees. we've trimmed payrolls and we've asked employees to do the job that sometimes two or three people of their co-workers were performing before. we've asked teachers, caseworkers, law enforcement personnel and agency heads to do more with less. and their commitment to go that extra mile deserves recognition. so i want to take a moment to speak directly to my fellow state employees, those in this building, in this room today, but literally those all across the state from one corner to the next. wherever you serve i want to recognize you and thank all of

you for putting in the extra effort and the extra hours to meet this challenge. i know that responsibility and workloads have increased, and can you have met that call with excellence. that doesn't go without notice. i notice your good work, your bosses notice it, most importantly your fellow georgians notice it. thank you, thank you, thank you. [applause] >> thank you for that well-deserved applause. i want to brag on these talented state team a little bit further. the men and women who make up team georgia have refused to make excuses, and they've found a way to deliver great customer service in the face of cuts. and that's why as i travel

across georgia citizens often continue to thank me for the services that you deliver. in fact, we've asked our customers how you're doing, and they've given you a customer satisfaction rate above 76 president. 76%. you may not know it, but that beats most private businesses and makes us one of the only states in the nation that compare favorably to the private sector the. state employees will also tell you that their job satisfaction has increased 10% in the last two years, and that fact comes from the thrill and the morale booster of helping other georgians. high employment means a satisfied customer and a satisfied employee. i want to continue improving to make georgia an employer of choice that can attract and retain top talent going forward. and i think it's appropriate at the beginning of this

legislative session to ask ourselves, each of us, deep down personally if we have this same mind set of service. now is the time to ask ourselves some very foundational questions. why are we here? what do the people expect of us? the answer to those questions i would like to recall the words of a great georgian who just passed away this last year, one of my heros, dr. michael guito. that great sewer of the seed had it right. he said greatness doesn't exist in reducing yourself to others 'service, but in reducing yourself to their service. it's an ideal that's distinctly georgian. seven years ago at my inaugural i reminded you of the motto adopted by georgia trustees, the

original colonists. do you remember? not for self, but for others. that was the charge back then, it was the charge seven years ago, and it's even more so the charge today. we are the trustees of the people's will. we owe them our best. that is the sacred trust of democracy. the covenant of service which you and i have with georgians must always be foremost in our hearts and minds. to do what is right by them, not what is best for ourselves or for even our party, even to do the hard things now for a better tomorr.

mercy and to walk humbly with our god. that charge has stuck with me for seven years. while circumstances have changed, many faces have come and gone, that call remains. it echoes in my heart and in my spirit. and it rings forth to you today. you may have heard the story about the decorated general. undefeated in battle throughout his long career, undefeated, when he finally found he'd met his match after being lured into his ambush, he called on his bugler to counseled the retreat.

when the bugler hesitated, he ordered. sound the retreat even louder. once again the bugler did not respond and the general angrily demanded to him immediately, sound the retreat! the bugler looked up at the general and said, sir, i don't know that call. and our men don't know how to retreat. it would be easy for us to sit here today and dread the tough decisions that lie ahead. but now is not the time to retreat. now is the time to dig in even deeper and do the hard things so that our children and grandchildren will know a better georgia. it's a tall order, but ours is a high calling. and you wouldn't be here if you weren't men and women especially marked by optimism, ambition and an unbelievable belief that we should be working to make things

the way they ought to be and can be. i know -- i am confident. i'm optimistic that this year we can achieve great things together and i know and believe we will. thank you. may god richly bless each of you, every one of you. may god bless the great state of georgia and our great nation. thank you. [applause]

>> middle and high school students, just a few days left to enter c-span's studentcam contest. send your 5 to 8 minute >> another state of the state address now by west virginia governor joe manchin. he speaks about coal mining, the economy and education.

from the state capital in charleston, west virginia, this is about 45 minutes. >> before i begin i would like for all of us to pause for a moment of silence. to turn our thoughts and prayers to the victims to the horrific natural disaster which struck haiti. [moment of silence] >> thank you. >> mr. president, mr. speaker, members of the board of public works, justices of the supreme court court of appeals, members of the legislature, my dear wife and first lady, distinguished guests, and my fellow west virginias, it is once again my honor to stand in this historical chamber and deliver my sixth state of the state address. while 2009 was a difficult year for many of us, our path toward

continued success is going to be even more challenging. last year i told you that west virginia was more prepared than most states to get through the worst recession our nation has faced in seven decades. our preparation has served the people of the mountain state very well. last year i said, we're in a planning mode, not a panicked mode, and that remains true today. when i look at west virginia, i see a state of accomplishment, not a state of disarray. and when i look at west virginia, i see a state of responsible, financial planning. not a state of economic turmoil. when i look at west virginia, i see a state of prosperity, not a state of missed opportunities. west virginia leads the nation in personal income growth and ranks second overall in the most recent index of state economic momentum. since 2005, 243 companies have located or expanded in west virginia.

and they have invested more than $9 billion here. our cost of living is far below the national average and our rainey day fund is still as strong as ever. and although our financial institutions were immune from this recession, all 61 commercial banks, headquartered in west virginia, are sound and well capitalized. we cannot stray from this bold path of responsible government. all of us have read the national heinz about employee furloughs, about government shutdowns and even about increased taxes. although our budget may be more slender than in recent years, we all should be proud that the state of our state is still strong. while we cannot afford to add any base building salary increases in fiscal year 2011, we are still able to provide annual employee increments. we are fully funding teacher and service personnel, step increases.

our welcome centers and rest stops have stayed open, our state offices have normal operating hours. our social services continue and we are paying our bills on time. [applause] >> 26 states are laying off or furloughing workers, at least 32 states have raised taxes or cut aid to local governments. i recently required our agencies to reduce their current general revenue budgets by 3.4%. it is the first time i've had to do a midyear budget reduction. i strongly believe that we can achieve these reductions by identifying even more efficiencies. i want to especially thank our supreme court and legislature for stepping up and taking voluntary actions to reduce their budgets as well. this cooperation in west virginia is making the difference.

responsible spending starts with responsible borrowing. last july west virginia became the first state to use the qualified school construction bond statewide, which is letting us build or improve dozens of schools at a much lower cost. we currently have $540 million in ongoing school construction, the largest amount in the history of the school building authority. but as you know, much more needs to be done. i am asking the legislature to give the sba more borrowing flexibility. this will not increase our debt limit. but will allow us to create a steady revenue stream and provide safer schools and more construction jobs at cheaper bond rates. we recently completed a $78 million bond issue to complete our community and technical colleges. more west virginians bought these bonds than almost any time in our history.

and it shows that the confidence that we have in our own state's financial condition is strong. we have had our share of challenges this past year. and some from mother nature, torrential rains in southern west virginia cause mudslides and flooding unlike anything i've ever witnessed. the devastation was horrible but the cooperation among first responders, coal miners and operators, volunteers and fema was remarkable. and recovery has been swift. i want to thank every person who pitched in and gave hope to those in need. in addition, i want to recognize our national guard. they aremw always prepared fore hard work here and overseas. our guard has nearly 800 men and women deployed throughout the world. with most of them in iraq and afghanistan. what all of the members of the national guard, all branches of

armed services including every veteran that has ever served, please stand up and let us recognize you and thank for the service you've given to this country and continue to give. [applause] >> we have to continuing to support our soldiers also when they come home. four years ago i made a pledge to several families that their loved ones would not have died in vain. just days after those accidents we passed our mine safety act that mandated crucial safety upgrades. we demanded rapid response, tracking in communications with our mines and additional oxygen supplies. west virginia had a record low

fatality. we're reporting and responding to more accidents rapidly. we installed more than 300 emergency rescue chambers. we have positioned additional breathing devices and we are better equipped to communicate with and track those working underground. no other state has met similar requirements. [applause] >> it is no secret west virginians are proud of their heritage and culture and we should be. our unique history should be shared with every west virginian and every visitor who comes to this marvelous capital. for many years we struggled with the state museum that needed direction and resources. we wanted to teach our children and visitors about west virginia in a way that our spirit, resilience and can-do attitude would shine. and our decision was to get the very best.

since we opened the museum in june, at least 50,000 people have visited. including school groups from 21 counties. it is one of the best in the nation. and i encourage you to visit. it'll make you you proud to be a west virginian. [applause] >> while the museum gives a great look into our past, if you want to see our future, you must look at the present. infrastructure pays our path to success. when we build a school, construct a road, install a water line or expand broadband and wireless technology, we are creating a lasting impact. we have carefully planned our stimulus spending reaching the most west virginians we can with the money we have been provided. west virginia is a top state for putting stimulus dollars to work on our highways and for building water and sewer lines. the stimulus funding was a shot

in the arm but no means address all of west virginia's challenges. we are working hard with limited resources and have planned an aggressive construction program in 2010. we are literally building roads and bridges to our future. the division of highways is working on the most projects since the interstates were first built. this year marks the tenth conservative year that we have budgeted over a billion state and federal dollars for our roads. last year we opened half of corridor h, advanced sections of 35, route 9, route 10, the coal fields expressway, the king coal highway and the fairmont gateway connecter, to name just a few. we're constructing more than 80 miles of 4-lane highway. our state clean water revolving fund which finances public water and sewer project is ranked among the top in the nation. last year alone we funded 18 different projects to provide

wastewater treatment for an additional 12,400 west virginians. small city block grants support the development of our cities by providing housing a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities. since 2005, we have awarded more than $83 million to benefit thousands of west virginians through the block grants. by investing in our communities, we are investing in our future. now, this is a census year. and with only 10 questions, it is the shortest questionnaire in question. but it still will determine the distribution of more than $400 billion annually for government services including healthcare, education, and police and fire protection. it is time for every west virginian to stand up and be and i ask all of you to join me in this effort. [applause]

>> government funding can accomplish what it's meant to do without partnerships with business and labor. the results show we are improving west virginia's business climate by privatizing workers' compensation, we dramatically lowered premiums and reduced our old workers fund comp debt by $1.7 billion. and by passing the aircraft tax credit and the high technology server farm tax credit, we are helping to diversify our economy and create well-paying jobs. but we must find ways to reduce the burden even more in our citizens and businesses. last year we reconvened the comprehensive tax modernization group. and upon their findings, i am recommending a constitutional amendment that will give us the flexibility that we need to lower taxes on commercial and industrial property.

while also considering the impact on local governments. this will help to create better jobs. [applause] >> this is about more than cutting taxes. it's about fair and progressive taxation that meets our state's needs and allows us to compete and prosper. and regardless of whether it's justified, west virginia has been fighting the perception of an unfair judicial system. last year i established the independent commission on judicial reform to address those concerns. i want to thank the commission and honorary chair justice sandra day o'connor for their thorough review. they have laid the groundwork for reform and in this i will introduce two bills based on their recommendations. the first piece of judicial reform legislation is a public

financing pilot project for the two supreme court seats that will be open for election in 2012. the goals is to relieve judges from the burden of political fundraising and to reduce the potential for appearance of bias as a result of campaign donations. this money would be available for both the primary and general elections. the second bill establishes a judicial advisory committee to aid the governor in the selection of judges for circuit court vacancies. almost half of our current circuit judges are initially appointed prior to being elected. this bill would ensure that only the most highly qualified individuals are considered for appointment and will enhance the transparency in this process. now, when i created the independent commission, i asked them to consider ways to broaden opportunities for appeals of circuit court decisions. i want to personally thank the justices of the supreme court for their insight and guidance. the supreme court, our supreme

court, has been studying this issue for the past several months. and i'm pleased to report that they have shared with me a proposal for major reform of the state's appellate process. through their constitutional rulemaking authority the supreme court court of appeals will soon issue rules for public comment that are intended to ensure there will be full appellate review by the court of all final decisions on the merits issued by the circuit courts in west virginia. this is a remarkable development and we should commend our supreme court for taking this action to move our state forward. thank you. [applause] >> our progress to build a new west virginia continues. we have begun to consolidate our state's outdated financial management system. a new enterprise resource planning project known as erp

will let us better track revenue and assets, payroll payments. this will provide the information we need to make timely decisions and the savings will be tremendous. west virginia is one of only three states awarded a grant from the pew center on the states that will help our agencies achieve even more measurable results. our pilot project begins this coming fiscal year. the past few months we've heard a lot of discussion about our state's vehicle fleet. let me say it is time to set excuses aside and tackle this long-standing problem. [applause] >> in october, i formed a task force to find identity how we can improve fleet management. and i said that we would take immediate steps to fix it this session. it's clear the overarching problem with the lack of centralized vehicle oversight and management. since 1990, two-thirds of the

state vehicle fleet has been exempted from the department of administration through legislation and administrative actions. our bill gets rid of those exemptions and it creates a separate fleet management office that will be held accountable for the entire state vehicle fleet. and that means every single vehicle the state of west virginia owns. [applause] >> we embrace the knowledge and appreciate the support from many organizations and groups of people. one long-standing challenge we face is retaining and attracting young and threatened people. -- talented people. the council is made up of dedicated volunteers. this group meets with me to discuss current issues affecting our state.

in may we will conduct the first governor's summit on young talent to connect our loose with top business and labor leaders. by harnessing the talent already inside our borders, we have a greater chance to bring back home those who yearn to work and live and play in our beautiful state. we also need to continue to evaluate our promise scholarship program. last year we took the necessary measures to ensure the program's viability. but i am asking for every promise graduate to make us is promise that you will do everything possible to stay in the state of west virginia. we can battle job loss by retooling our work force and by investing in our community and technical colleges. more than 90 new programs have been implemented the past three years and last fall community college enrollment increased more than 16%.

adult student enrollment increased more than 25%. many of those students are dislocated workers upgrading their skills.gd5 enrollment in allied health programs, which are high-demand ordinary care presumptive probations critically needed in west virginia increased almost 25% the past three years. we must transform our economy that is innovation driven, technology-based and piloted by a highly skilled west virginia work force. bucks for brains is creating great results at wvu, marshall and other universities. as a result of our $50 million endowment, we are attracting private investors and together west virginia is moving to the top in research and development. the number of students majoring in science, technology, engineering and math continues to rise. we have more faculty and we're

attracting world class researchers to west virginia.,& our colleges and universities are more prepared than ever to take us to the next level. but our children have to get to college first. the statistics are eye-opening. amazingly, the united states and germany are the only western democracies in which parents are more likely to have earned a college degree than their children. and in west virginia, for every 100 ninth graders in school today, statistics tell us only 16 will graduate from college. and while enrollment in public colleges and universities is higher than ever, our graduation rates are very disappointing. our greatest challenge is to make sure that those who start college will finish it. learning additional skills beyond high school is more critical than ever for west virginians.

that is why i am asking all of our technical and four-year colleges and universities to freeze their tuition rates for the coming school year. [applause] >> as we grow new business and technology sectors we must still support the traditional industries that have helped build our state and make this nation great. west virginia will play an increasing major role in our energy's future. west virginia ranks second in the nation in exporting electricity. and most of our coal and natural gas is sent out of state. 2009 was a tough year for coal. despite the fact that half of our nation's electricity is generated by coal and that our national economy depends on this abundant, reliable and affordable energy, some want to

vilifyize this that helped us win two world wars and helped build the greatest country in the world. [applause] >> we must continue to stand up for our coal miners and their families. we're not asking for a handout. all we're asking for is the permission to work. [applause] >> we are reaching new and better ways to use our coal. there is a plans to be had between our economy and our environment. and west virginia is leading the way in finding balance. our alternative and renewable energy portfolio require one-fourth of the energy used in our state to come from alternative or renewable energy resources by the year 2025. a progressive law such as this is already paying off. we have more than 1,000

megawatts of wind power in service or in development. that's enough power to take care of more than 250,000 homes, 250,000 homes. and we have the third largest wind capacity of any eastern state. the world's first successful carbon capture and sequestration -- this is a tough one. [laughter] >> sequestration project is at aep's mountaineer power plant in mason county. and an advanced pilot project is capturing c02 at the dow chemical plant in south charleston. these pilot projects will lead the way for implementation of this technology at coal-fired power plants around the world. plans are moving ahead on a coal to liquids project in mingo county that will use state-of-the-art cleaner coal technology. through this technology west

virginia coal will be our primary energy source as we make the transition to the fuels of the future. we are advancing wood and coal cofiring plants as part of our energy mix. and virtually all of our state's hydropower capacity is being used.7;r and with new ways to recover massive natural gas reserves from the marcelleas shell we are points to power our nation for the next century. last year we also passed a post-mining land use bill that requires surface mine operators to have a plan for how the land they want to mine will be restored. those plans include highways, industrial parks, schools, recreational facilities, farms, and other renewable and alternative energy projects. this law is about creating jobs. we are not only a leader in energy, we are also a leader in adventure. last february we found out that the boy scouts were looking for a new home.

now, not only did the scouts choose west virginia for one of their high adventure bases, they chose us as the centerpiece for the ne 100 yearsf scouting in america. [applause] >> the summit becktell at the new river court and jury will bo the primary site at the national scout jamboree. it give us an unprecedented opportunity to showcase west virginia to tourists as well. the scouts are investing hundreds you of millions of dollars and will create more than 1,000 permit and by the time jobs. i truly believe this could be a game-changer for the state of west virginia.gpñ

the scouts exemplify the values we west virginians hold so dear, leadership, and respect for the environment. from our development office to the local scout councils and the people of southern west virginia who all work tirelessly to make this dream a reality, i want to personally thank you and we all owe them a round of applause. >> in addition to teaching our youth the values and skills important to a successful life, we continue our battle against illegal drug use, which is one of the worst blights in our communities. when i became governor, we began dedicating additional funding and resources to combat the drug problem. we are seeing results. in 2008, the bureau of criminal

investigation unit alone took more than $13 million in drugs off the streets. up from $910 just a few years ago. felony drug arrests nearly tripled from 2004 until 2008. last july we announced operation eviction, which pooled state resources with county and city agencies to get drugs out of our communities. and we are taking it to the next level. we have a simple message to all drug dealers if west virginia, get out of our state now wh you still can. [applause] >> now, we're not just going after the dealers themselves. we're going after the places where they operate. vacant and run-down properties harbor illegal activity and they also lessen the appeal of our towns and lower the values of

our homes and buildings that are maintained by responsible property owners. that's why i'm introducing legislation that will allow our cities to collect fees from absentee owners for vacant properties that they don't keep up. it will encourage residents -- [applause] >> it will encourage residents and business to take pride in their communities and to help spruce up our cities. unfortunately, after a damaging fire, some property owners take their fire insurance money and run leaving the city with a dangerous abandoned building they cannot afford to demolish. we are joining our cities and the insurance federation on a bill that gives more flexibility to clean up buildings damaged beyond repair by fire by allowing the cities to place a lien on the fire insurance policies. like most states, west virginia

is facing a dramatically increasing prison population we cannot simply sustain. last year i established the commission on prison overcrowding to provide recommendations on how we can address this problem. the state supreme court has also studied this issue. and an interim report of its commission reached many of the same conclusions we did. over the years, we've done a good job of locking criminals up. but a poor job of rehabilitating nonviolent offenders and helping them become productive citizens. we're always going to be tough on crime. but we must adopt a different approach or we will have an insurmountable problem. tonight i'm introducing a bill that will streamline our parole system and use our prisons to keep those violent offenders where they belong, locked up. this accelerated parole system has been tested in other states and is one part of an overall plan to free up our prison resources.

this program would only be opened to nonviolent offenders and those convicted of crimes that do not, and i repeat, do not involve a child. following through on the commission's other recommendations we are renovating the jack withrow hospital and we will be working with west virginia state university for the combined purpose of expanding our work release program and renovating the former rehabilitation center and institute. we look forward to creating new opportunities for the university, its faculty, staff and students. by using existing state facilities we're addressing the overcrowding problem, saving money and creating opportunities. these issues will not be fixed overnight. however, by working closely with the legislature and corrections officials, we will find the best way to solve these problems once

and for all. we're not being soft on crime. we're being smart on crime. [applause] >> our single largest budget item is education. our challenge of education are greater than ever. but success begins in that classroom. our 2010 west virginia teacher of the year gretchen sheriffer teaches math at morgantown high school. gretchen created an after-school act/sat prep class that has helped many students increase their scores enough to qualify for the promise scholarship. she exemplifies the commitment of our educators who put children first and find innovative ways to help them succeed. gretchen, will you please stand and be recognized. [applause]

>> i also want to acknowledge toyota motors and mountain state blue cross and blue shield for their continued support of our teacher of the year program. president obama and secretary of education arne duncan said our nation has fallen behind in education and job skills. shockingly the united states is now the only industrialized country where young people today are less likely to earn a diploma than their parents were. if we are to remain a world leader and if we want west virginia and other states to break the cycle of poverty, we

must not be afraid to make the changes that are needed to succeed. more than 40 billion stimulus dollars will be available for states and schools to lay the foundation for a generation of education reform. and $5 billion will be set aside for new ways to produce results in our classrooms. it's known as race to the top. we as a state have applied for the first round of funding based on our present education system. but let me say, if west virginia is not awarded this first round of race to the top funding, i will ask you, and i will call you in this legislature back to a special session on education to make the changes needed to win the second round of funding which will be awarded in june. let me assure you i will always push for the bold changes that will allow us to succeed nationally and globally.

that is why i will introduce, reintroduce, a proposal of immediate importance to our children's education. our current law requires students to attend school for 180 days a year. but let's face the facts, this is not happening. that is why i'm asking you to pass a bill that guarantees that every county is able to comply with this law and provide 180 days of instruction. we must pass this bill because it's that important. no excuse this time. we owe it to our children. [applause] >> we also owe a lot to our seniors, which i affectionately refer to as our experienced citizens who share so much with our children. since 2005 we have dedicated an additional $26 million to senior services, the highest amount in our state's history.

most importantly i have been committed to giving them the tools they need to maintain a healthy, happy and independent lifestyle. we have provided 35 brand-new food delivery trucks to county senior service agencies and we will reach our goal to equip every county this year with one. last year the bureau of senior services helped more than nutrition, transportation, job training and in-home care. as well as respite for those with alzheimer's disease. we also signed the silver alert bill which helps locate missing seniors by quickly notifying responders. and we continue to debate healthcare remember to note, west virginia is the leader for healthcare coverage for children. last january the west virginia

children's health insurance program known as chips. this program has served 118,000 children since it began. including this in private insurance we are covering almost every child in west virginia. [applause] >> we have joined with local businesses, food suppliers, volunteers and the department of education to include more freshly prepared local foods on the school menus. this initiative began through the efforts of chef jamie oliver. if this program works, it will become a model for the rest of west virginia and the entire nation. beginning in october, the west virginia women, infants and children program or wic started

providing fresh fruits and vegetables to qualifying families each month. wic helps our infants and children eat properly. and it improves access to healthcare. children up to the age of 5 are eligible and 70% of all infants born in west virginia can use this vital program. wic also is distributing more than 155,000 free books that teach our children about the joys of physical activity and eating healthy foods. last year we added seven additional counties to the imagination library. this library program started by dolly parton, provides free books from children to birth until their fifth birthday. the imagination library will soon expand into 14 northern counties adding more than 23,000 eligible children by august. some 46% of our children live in

low-incomed homes where parents struggle to provide for their families. sadly poverty often persists through generation upon generation. this cycle is difficult to break. parents without additional education and skill-sets often struggle to earn enough to support their families. and cannot provide these educational opportunities to their children. the best way to improve the chances for lifelong success of children who live in poverty is to ensure that they have the same education opportunities as other children. in west virginia, 49% of low income fourth graders read below grade level. and research shows that children who score below grade level at this age are unlikely ever to catch up. this creates a lifelong deficit that is rarely overcome. last year we passed the third and eighth grade screening bill

that provides additional resources to help students who are not meeting the standards at these critical grade levels. but we all know we must do more. for more than 75 years, save the children has helped kids thrive by improving their health, education and economic opportunities. they are working in more than 150 communities across the country to help lessen the impact of poverty on children. with our support, save the children will help our most needy kids acquire the skills they need to succeed and build a lifelong love of learning. so i am directing $1 million to their efforts in our rural counties. it will provide another tool to give our children the chance they deserve. ht tthe first lady's attention by one of our own, our state's most recognized citizens. she's a mother of two young

daughters who truly cares about her home state and she's a national ambassador for early childhood education. she presents a positive image of west virginia wherever she goes and she's always proud to tell her millions of fans where she grew up. her dedication to children has taken her to the halls of congress and brought her back home to build support for these important initiatives. tonight, and i am so pleased that she has joined us here to highlight this important message. i would like for our own, our own west virginian jennifer garner to please stand and be recognized. [applause]

>> thank you, jennifer. for introducing this valuable program to west virginia. we look forward with working with save the children to help move our state and our nation forward. now jennifer is joined tonight by mark shriver. will you please stand and be recognized. [applause] >> his sister eunice would be proud of him tonight. above all our children should always be our top priority. president kennedy once instead children are the world's most valuable resource and its best hope for the future. sadly, if you could see what our state police see every day, you'd be more concerned than

ever about the dangers our children are facing. on any given day, 300 west virginia children including infants and toddlers are sexually abused. 1,000 computers each month in west virginia possess or distribute child pornography. this is an international problem that is stealing the innocence from our children. an innocence that can never be replaced. i'm committed to making west virginia a leader in fighting this most horrible type of crime. since september of 2006, the child protection unit with only six state troopers has arrested nearly 1300 offenders. this is clearly not enough. to better target predators and concentrate our efforts, the state police consolidated and formed the crimes against children unit. this new unit covers the entire state. but they're not the only ones in this fight. they join the west virginia

department of health and human resources, child protective services as well as multidisciplinary teams from across the state. there is nothing that i will do as governor or that you will do as a lawmaker that isn't more important than this. we must devote more resources and funding to these efforts. [applause] >> next week in this chamber i will join state and local police, child protection agencies and groups who are leading the charge against these crimes in a video presentation to our legislature that i'm sure it's going to shock you as it did me. the video illustrates the urgent need to take action. and right now i'm asking the legislature to fund 6 additional troopers and support staff for

the crimes against children unit. [applause] >> this will be a huge step towards creating a safer environment for our children. i know you join me in saying that we will not stand by and lose another child to a predator. we cannot stand by and allow this to happen. west virginia's most famous author summed up the importance of children best when she wrote, if our american way of life fails the child, it fails us all. when i was first inaugurated and every year since i have been been governor i have spoken about the five promises that we should keep to every child. at the heart of those promises is the principle that every child should have a safe place and a healthy start. many of the bold initiatives i have discussed tonight are tailored for our youngest

citizens because they have no voice and they have the opportunity to sucked. -- succeed. we must be there to provide that opportunity. we are all in this together and we must continue to work together to ensure our children are healthy, happy, and most importantly loved. for our children and grandchildren to grow up and be productive adults, they must have a strong start. we must do our part now to make a positive impact on their future because i assure you west virginia's future depends on it. thank you. god bless you and god save the great state of west virginia. [applause]

[applause]

>> the british government's official inquiry examining events surrounding the iraq war began last week in london. testifying before a five-member committee was alastair campbell communications chief for former prime minister tony blair. he's been accused of exaggerating intelligence to determine weapons of mass destruction in iraq. secretary jack strong is expected to testify before the commission. these proceedings last about four and a half hours. >> good morning, everyone. when we announced this first round of public hearings we said the first five weeks would be dedicated a chronology of the u.k.'s involvement in iraq between 2001 and 2009 and we've almost completed that phase. and today we're moving on to

hear from ministers and the most senior decision-makers over the next four weeks. we will then take a break over the period of the general election before resuming public hearings in the summer. we have yet to decide which witnesses we'll be calling back at that point. and these forthcoming sessions will not be the only opportunity to hear from them. and our approach in this phase is going to be to build on what we've already heard, to seek further information, clarify points and explore different perspectives. the committee has yet to conclude what its formal lines of inquiry will be. today our witness is alastair campbell, you are director of communications and strategy to the prime minister including from the start of our period 2001, although it goes back long before until august 2003. the objectives of today's session will be to cover some of the key meetings on u.k. policy

development that mr. campbell was involved in as a close advisor to the prime minister. the presentation of the case for military action including the drafting of the two dossiers of september '02 and february '03 and the presentational concerns surrounding the preparations of military action and its aftermath. now, much of this is familiar ground. that's already been examined by the work of lord hutton and the butler committee as well as various parliamentary committees. many of the relevant documents are already in the public domain so we shall not be declassifying further documents today. we hope to be finished by lunchtime but there's a lot of ground to cover. now, i say this at every hearing. we recognize that witnesses are giving evidence based on their recollection of events. we, of course, check what we hear against the papers to which we have access. i remind every witness that they

will later be asked to sign a transcript of their evidence to the effect that the evidence they've given is truthful, fair and accurate. and with that we'll begin the questioning. >> mr. campbell, good morning. you worked for mr. blair from 1994 until you announced your resignation on the 29th of august, 2003. did that make you by 2003 the longest-serving of his close advisors? >> no. i'm trying to remember when jonathan powell arrived. i think he was just after me. there were certainly people in downey street who had been around before i joined tony blair's team. >> you were effectively on the team you and jonathan powell were two long-serving advisors. now, in the period 2001 to 2003,

which we're looking at this morning, you as the chairman said were the prime minister's director of communications of strategy. that's a very broad job description. what was your actual role? >> how i would define it is that my job is to work with the prime minister in particular but also other ministers and officials to help devise and implement communication strategies for the government and the prime minister both in relation to overall direction and objectives and also in relation to specific issues as they arose. that's how i would define my job. >> just communication strategies? >> political strategies, i would say that in relation to the communication and the strategy bit is the communications that i understood, but i think the longer i was with him, the more

i think he developed a deeper understanding and so did i of the importance of strategic communications in terms of -- as really being the only way of dealing with the media as it was changing. that's a pace that frankly was faster than any of us could have predicted. so i think it was -- i would say that was the essence of my job was to -- >> but you weren't just dealing with communications in the media. i mean, the word "strategy" can embrace anything. >> it can, yeah. >> you said in your diary that you weren't a traditional communications director. you have said that you basically were there to do whatever the prime minister asked you to do. would that be accurate? >> look, if he asked me to jump off a building, i wouldn't be do it. if he thought anything i thought to be silly and improper i wouldn't do it but he never did.

and once more, i think -- i think it's really important to set a context of this in terms of when i talked earlier about the changing nature of the media. it has had a significant impact upon policy, policy-making, upon government, government institutions. i guess my job is to try to advise him and also other ministers and colleagues in government through some of the tricky currents that threw up. but, you know -- >> i mean, your diary on the 7th of april, 2002, you wrote of yourself and jonathan powell, what we did was largely driven by what t.b. wanted us to do and what our personalities best allowed us to do. so that's pretty broad. how close would you say your relations were with the prime minister? >> very.

but i think -- you know the prime minister. he's somebody who understood that the job of leadership that he had, he could not do it alone. he was dependent upon political colleagues, some of whom he would be personally very close to, others that he wouldn't, but all of whom would be giving him something by nature of the job that he was trying to do. >> let's go into that in a bit more detail. i mean, you've talked of yourself, you've talked of jonathan powell. who part from the two of you would you have said constituted of the circle of the prime minister's policy advisors in the term we were talking about >> i would put ahead of david and me david manning in a long way. >> he spent more time with the prime minister than you and jonathan? >> i would certainly say that in

terms of -- i mean, you'll be able to ask tony blair he comes to the inquiry. david manning -- >> okay, so david manning. >> certainly myself and jonathan. we would probably see the prime minister first thing every morning. we'd probably see him last thing at night and we'd see him plenty of times if between. i would say then -- david manning's team was important in the context of the structure and meetings as they developed over time. and jonathan scarlet was important and david taylor was important. i would say in this particular context jack straw he would have seen as often with the exception of john prescott and at different times gordon brown. and then the team beyond thatwñ sally morgan was very important in relation to the prime

minister's relations with the political system and the parliamentary labour party and so forth. but he's somebody -- and i sometimes talk about his decision-making style what i call a circular conversation where he's talking different people over a time frame and absorbing different thoughts and influences. and in terms of policymaking, i've never been a policy person and never claimed to be a policy person but i would be his person who was always thinking -- ..

systems of the inherited in my view were not fit for purpose. they had to be >> if we can just come back to the period -- >> no, but it explains why i was doing the job that i did at the time that i did it, and how he understood that on something not just issues to do with foreign affairs and security, but on any of the major issues and high-profile issues you have to have a communications element, if you like, embedded in those policy discussions. >> okay. so in the circle of people that you describe, you've talked or yourself, jonathan powell, sir david manning, john scarlet, sir richard dearlove of sis, did the prime minister seek advice also frequently in the period we're talking about from peter mandelson? >> no, sir, not as far as i'm aware. >> [inaudible] >> he may from time to time have spoken to him, but i certainly

wouldn't have said -- >> would he have discussed questions about iraq privately or informally with the then-chancellor gordon brown? >> absolutely, yeah. >> yes. quite a lot? >> i would have thought so, yeah. it was -- at the time there was, obviously, this went over a long period of time, and there were periods during this whole, that you're looking into where actually domestic policy was far more dominant within the public debate. but i would say certainly that gordon brown would have been one of the key ministers that he would have spoken to regularly, yeah. >> so as the policy developed 2001 to 2003, gordon brown would have been very much part of the private circle of consultation. >> i would say so, yeah. >> yeah. >> and so would john prescott. >> so going back to the prime minister's working methods, would he from time to time assemble you, the close advisers we've talked about, as a group to the when he was wrestling with issues on iraq, would he

get you all together, or would he talk to you individually? would it happen almost ad hoc? how did it work? >> i think it, in terms of if i can sort of take you through a week, as it were. the prime minister used to work for normally weekends in terms of reading, reading not just official papers, but reading history and all sorts of things, he would use the weekend to get the himself time for, i suppose you'd call it a bit deeper reflection. and i think he would also then be phoning people. certainly i used to, would be phoned on the weekend, and i would know he was phoning other people as well. and he would be having lots of conversations between john prescott, gordon browne, jonathan -- gordon brown, jonathan powell, lots of different people. he would phone people outside the circle. not necessarily about making decisions, his constituency agent he'd want to know what

they said in sedgefield, he'd want to speak to mps about what was happening. he would then in terms of a specific discussion he used most mondays used to start with the prime minister having sent a note out to what you would call his inner circle. and that would be the basis for a meeting on monday morning. and when you got a meeting specifically to do with iraq, from memory the people who would almost certainly be at those would be jeff straw, jeff hune, admiral boyce, john scarlet, sometimes richard dearlove and myself probably -- >> but that's a sort of formal meeting on iraq. >> but i think that's what most of the discussions would be. in terms of the sort of discussions i might have with the prime minister out with, that they would probably certainly, usually in the morning first thing, but that's just about getting the day in shape and working out whether i

need to change the diary to this or that and which phone calls is he making -- >> that wouldn't be a single-topic discussion, would it? >> no. no. and then in terms of through the day it would be dealing with situations and issues as they arose. >> now, these informal discussions, phone calls and so on other than the minutes you say the prime minister might well have deliver canned over the weekend that you discuss on a monday morning, were they recorded or minuted in any other way? >> not routinely i wouldn't say, no. i, my approach tended to be if i felt there was, there were things arising from those conversations that had then to be communicated to others who might be -- because often it would be the prime minister phoning me to ask me to do something. could be anything. by talking to the media, talking to other politicians, talking to people he just wanted me to talk to to get his view across to

them, whatever it might be. if it was, on the other hand, something where i was required to start work on a speech or start to work on an argument that we were developing, it might require me then to write around to other people to say the prime minister wants a, b, c. >> and you'd do that by e-mail, would you? >> i would usually dictate that to the garden room if it was the weekend, or if it was the week, i would dictate it to my pa. >> [inaudible] can you recall anybody, the prime minister found particularly helpful as a sort of sounding board or a source of information on iraq and the middle east? >> i can't. i'd have to go and think about that. there's nobody comes immediately to mind. he, as i -- look, he, you're probably better asking jonathan. >> okay. we'll pursue that further. so just to sort of summarize this discussion about your role

before we get into more detailed areas of policy, to recapitulate you were involved in a lot of the discussions about policy and strategy on iraq as an adviser to the prime minister as you told the foreign affairs committee, that's correct? you, as you also told the foreign affairs committee and as you've just said, you attended a huge number of meetings with the prime minister on this subject, and then you played an interdepartmental coordinating role on policy communication, that's something you described to lord hutton's inquiry. and what you did, your title was strategy as well as communications, your role was not restricted to communications. it effectively allowed you to range right across the board of government policy insofar as the prime minister wanted you to do so. >> i think that's fair, yes. >> all of that would be a fair summary. >> i'd like to make the point about the cross-departmental

communications. i think this is important. when i talked about the systems that we inherited, it was very much silo-driven. it was department by department, it was very difficult to get, i found, to get departments on the communications side of things to work together. and my approach to this by the time we get to iraq was very much driven by our experience in relationship to kosovo where we did ultimately, i think, quite successfully put together, we internationalized our communication cans, but also we managed to get a sense of departments working together. so there was an understanding that number 10, if you like, was leading on the strategy, but there was maximum openness with all the various departments. and then sharing of personnel and trying to bring people, if you like, onto the same page literally in the same room where you take an approach to

communications which is not here's this department, here's that department, they're all doing their own thing. >> i'd like to talk now, and we'll come back later to questions of how the government worked and the cabinet worked, but just to one element that's very relevant, i think, to today's discussion which is how closely did you work with the intelligence and security agencies? >> how closely did can i work? there yes. >> yes. you personally. >> i'd say at times very closely. most of my time working for the prime minister i didn't have that much to do with intelligence agencies. i would say in terms of an intense period of contact and consultation with the intelligent services i would say post-septemberseptember 11th ang iraq, during the iraq crisis they were the two high points, i suppose. >> you hold lord hutton that, and again, i quote, i over

several years now have worked very closely with the intelligence agencies, particularly during these conflict situations. >> yeah. >> and you had access to the highly-classified as well as papers including jic papers. >> i did. and i was able to see them. i didn't routinely view those reports, and i didn't go out looking for them either. but i, what i found was that intelligence agencies, always somewhat to my surprise, i felt kind of got this point that i made earlier about how communications was changing better than other parts of government. >> but you were able to see jic assessments if you wanted to see them, the work that they produced on a weekly basis? >> if i wanted to, but i didn't go around looking for them. when i, when i thought about close consultation with them, it

was, i suppose during those periods when they were routinely coming to the prime minister's meetings. and also i know we'll come on to the september 2002 today yea, but obviously, that was a period of intelligence cooperation and consultation. >> yes. i mean, if we take that period, we will come back to this in more detail, you told lord hutton that on the 12th of september, 2002, you attended a meeting. you said this was, i quote, the meeting was with the prime minister, jonathan paul, david manning, myself, the head of the sis and the senior sis officer. the last of these explained that there had been a new source in recent weeks who had given them new information. we were being told this because the information was important, but also it was being emphasized that this was information that could not go into the dossier.

>> yep. >> now, why should the directer of communications and strategy have been included in such a sensitive meeting with two senior officers of the sis when it did not concern information that was publicly usable? >> probably because the short answer's probably because the prime minister wanted me to be, and i suspect -- [inaudible] may have been as well. i don't know. i mean, i happened to be at a lot of the prime minister's meetings. but at that time the heads of the intelligence agencies, i suppose, were spending more time in downing street than they normally might. and i happened to be there. i was also at that time, as that makes clear, involved in the process of the production of the september dossier. >> i mean, when i worked in government, there used to be something called the need to know principle to protect very highly-classified information.

was this information that you in your job needed to know? >> no. >> it wasn't? and -- >> it was, nonetheless, helpful in the where i was at that time with the work that was going on with the dossier that was being published. it was actually quite helpful to know. did i need to know it in terms of my job preparing the dossier? no. >> wouldn't it have been more normal for sis to have conveyed this very sensitive information through the chairman of the jic on number 10 downing street? >> that may well already have happened, i don't know. >> well, why would they have needed to see the prime minister if it had happened already? >> well, the prime minister maybe wanted to use his own judgment, or richard dearlove is very, very senior figure within the intelligence services. clearly, if he wanted access to the prime minister, he'd have it. >> and he saw him quite frequently? >> i'd say so, yes. >> why was john scarlet not at

that meeting, the jic chairman? >> i don't know that he wasn't. >> you didn't visit him. >> that's true, but that was a diary scribbled together. i'm simply saying as far as my recollection goes, i do remember the meeting. i remember that richard dearlove was accompanied by this other person who explained what did appear to be quite significant intelligence to the prime minister, but equally it was, it was to inform him rather than to, as it were, tell him anything that was then going to be divulged in public. >> are you aware of any precedent for somebody who'd been the prime minister's press secretary but was now the directer of communications to have the level of access that you had to of which this is just one example, to -- and the direct relationship with the intelligence agencies? >> it's not for me -- you know, you'd have to ask my

predecessors in the job. i don't know what those relations were with the intelligence agencies, i don't know. it's not for me to know, it's for them to know. >> but you're not aware of any precedent? >> i'm not aware or unaware of any precedent. i'd be very surprised if the people in my job at some point did not meet people from the intelligence services. and i go back to the point i made earlier that i felt the intelligence services did understand that in these really complicated international situations, communications and an assessment of communications was an important part of what they were doing as well as what we were doing in downing street. >> but essentially, the role that you were playing as directer of communications and strategy was not really one that had existed in that form before. it was new, perhaps for the reasons you've already given, and so you as one of the two or

three closest advisers to the prime minister were playing a much wider and more sensitive role at the half of government -- >> that's probably true. look, i have no experience with another government other than covering it as a journalist and -- >> what you watched it fairly closely as political editor. >> yeah. but i have no direct experience other than reading books of how people -- >> but your role was very central. anything important that was happening at the center of government you would basically have known about and probably have been involved in. >> i'd certainly be involved in discussions about it, not least because anything, anything of that level is likely at some point to have contact with the public do main. >> okay. >> and that was part of my job, was to make sure that the government's position on any given issue at any given time was being put across properly to the public. >> thank you. that's very helpful. i think this makes it easier for

us, now, to go into some of the specific areas of policy that you would have been having these discussions about. and perhaps i should at this point -- >> yeah. just before we take up other questioning, do other colleagues want to raise anything? >> earlier there was a question which was you haven't mentioned the involvement of the cabinet secretary at any of these meetings. what was his involvement, if any, at any of these crucial meetings? >> i think he was involved, in all sorts of meetings, and certainly once they got on to the -- because what tended to happen was a group that comprise ed geoff straw, geoff hoon, cds, john scarlett would see the prime minister prior to a broad admin sterile group. and also don't forget the cabinet, i mean, the cabinet

secretary is in and out of downing street the whole time. >> now, i want to be -- [inaudible] buildup to the dossier. as we've heard from other witnesses that after 9/11 and the efforts of the evil speech and the process pectd of u.s.-led military action to affect regime change in iraq loomed larger than ever. and sir christopher mer told us that he received new instructions from downing street in march 2002, and that when the pm and the president met at crawford in april, they went there to talk about containment of sharpening sanctions, he said. did you agree with the prime minister's views on regime change? >> sorry, what were you saying that crester if said? >> christopher mer said -- >> i read his evidence, but -- >> he said they weren't there to

talk about containment of sharpening sanctions. >> i thought in certain respects christopher meyer's evidence didn't portray an accurate picture of crawford at all -- >> not the site, but i would like to say did you agree with the prime minister's views on regime change? >> well, if you're saying to me, do i agree with christopher meyer's analysis that the prime minister shifted his position from one of containment to regime change, then i don't accept that at all. >> i'm talking about the meeting at crawford. >> i know. >> and i'm really asking you again, did you agree with the prime minister's views on regime change? it's your views, not the -- >> i agreed with the prime minister's views which were -- the prime minister was not saying at crawford, we now have a policy of regime change. the prime minister was absolutely clear both before

crawford, at crawford and subsequent to crawford that the policy of the british government was to pursue disarmament of saddam hussein through united nations, and i think that was very, very clear in his public comments at the time. it is concern and the reason why i think it's important to point out that i think christopher meyer's rather overstated things there, for example, he made a point about the speech that the prime minister made the next day at the george bush sr. presidential library, the first time he'd ever talked about regime change. if you actually read the speech, he talks about the three previous occasions on which he had been involved in regime change, the taliban, sierra he krone and kosovo. and so i don't really accept this analysis that at crawford there was this fundamental shift of approach in policy by the prime minister. and on your point about did i support the prime minister in relation to his pursuit of disarmament of saddam hussein

and the way he was doing it, yes, i did. >> you did support it. >> i did. >> and what were the others in the close circle, were they of the same o view? >> well, i think you'd have to ask them. short answer is, yes. i think it's unfair to expect me to put their position when i know they're part of the inquiry as well. >> in your diary i think on the meeting on the 7th of march in 2002 you say that the cabinet was mainly about iraq. not executive division, but a lot of concern where it is going. what were the concerns? >> march the 7th. so that was pre-crawford. yeah. i can't -- look, i can't remember the discussion in any detail, but i do remember there was a sense of people just raising concerns. concerns in relation to is this happening? is there some sort of either rush to war which there never

was, but i think just the periods where the issue of iraq just kept bubbling up and bubbling up and ministers were quite rightly raising concerns which the prime minister would no doubt have sought to address. >> okay. can i now actually move to the craw ford meeting -- crawford meeting? because you accompanied the prime minister to crawford. and can you tell me what exactly did tony blair -- [inaudible] in this meeting with president bush at crawford? >> i was, i was not at the meeting that they had dinner together, didn't they? >> yes. but us you were briefed about it. >> yeah. so that was, obviously, where considerable discussion took place. that evening, as i recall, myself, jonathan powell, david manning, i think christopher meyer had a separate dinner with condy rice, karl rove and.

[inaudible] and i do remember an awful lot of the discussion, and i credible at the -- can remember at the dinner or an awful lot of discussion was about the middle east because at the time that was a really pressing issue. and i think that took up an awful lot of the president and the prime minister's discussions as well. in relation to iraq, i went up to where the president and the prime minister were the following morning. i think there had been separate discussions that david manning had been there which i think he'll have talk thed to you about, and then there was kind of a broader meeting where things were recapped. but insofar as they were recapped, it was to say that, i mean, the prime minister, he shared the american analysis on iraq. in terms of the threat that saddam hussein posed. also in terms of the continued defiance of the united nations.

but -- so he was saying we shared analysis and we shared the objectives -- >> and the analysis were about the extent of the threat? >> the analysis was about the threat that saddam hussein posed to both the stability in that region, security in that region and also to the authority of the united nations. and the prime minister emphasized that the whole way through. and so what came out of -- i'm trying to remember what he actually said, the press conference afterwards. he talked about leaving iraq to develop wmd in flagrant breach of united nations resolutions is not an option. the response would be calm, measured and sensible, that all the options available would be considered. now, at the same press conference george bush restated, quote, the policy of my government is the removal of saddam. that was since bill clinton's time the policy of the american

administration. but the -- >> but did the prime minister make clear to him that that wasn't the u.k. policy? >> yes. yes. and they knew that anyway. the prime minister made clear throughout this that our objective was disarmament of saddam hussein through the united nations forcing him to comply with a stream of united nations resolutions. now, so what i think then followed and the reason, again, sorry to go back -- >> can i just vupt you? >> yeah. >> when the president talked about military action, how did the prime minister respond to him? >> the president wasn't talking about military action. he was simply saying that their policy is regime change. bill clinton's policy was regime change. >> that's true, but -- >> george bush wasn't sitting there saying, we're ant to go to war. >> but you can't have regime change without take thing some kind of action. >> no, but my point is about the discussion, the discussion that they had was about there was a

discussion clearly about iraq and, again, when you no doubt have seen the records of the visit, but also you'll have the opportunity to speak to tony blair himself. but in terms of the context that i'm trying to give you is not that george bush is saying, come on, tony, we've got to go to war. he was saying we've got this real problem with saddam hussein. post-septemberseptember 11th bo, he was saying, share this analysis, and tony bayer was on -- blair was on -- he mentioned this in his very first statement after september 11th, his genuine fear of wmd, failed states, terrorism coming together with absolutely lethal devastating consequences. they shared that analysis. they clearly shared the analysis that saddam was an awful, brutal dictatorial, barbarous regime. they shared the fear about his wmd program.

and george bush is simply saying as he said publicly at the press conference, our policy is regime change. tony blair was making clear that the british policy was to pursue disarmament to force him to face up to his obligations as a success accessive united nation resolutions. and as i recall it -- i wasn't at that meeting, but i recall some of the discussion afterwards. as i understand it, what president bush had said to the prime minister is that there was a very kind of small team over there looking at military options. and that -- >> this has been -- >> over there as in not many people involved and it's -- yeah. >> yeah. >> and that was, that was going on. and, indeed, i suspect because one assumed because there'd been a fairly public debate you mentioned, i mean, i know the previous witnesses have talked about in the immediate aftermath

of september 11th quite a lot of people on the american side of things going on about iraq and saddam then and the british government from the prime minister down saying, you know, hold on a minute, this is about the taliban, not afghanistan. so the point is when it got to that discussion, there's george bush, i think, saying to tony blair, we are -- there is some planning going on. but it was not -- we had a meeting, i remember i read the -- >> when -- >> sorry, points about that. before we went to crawford, the prime minister had a meeting with the british military here. to talk about where they thought the americans were, what were the sort of options that they might be looking at now, and i can remember that was a meeting, and i can remember admiral boyce setting out his analysis of what he believed the american thinking to be at the time, and

that was, that then informed the discussion the prime minister had with president bush. >> but is it your understanding that when president bush talked about the planning going on in states about military planning going on, that the prime minister -- did the prime minister give any commitment of the british troops to that planning? >> no. no, i think the -- i think that really goes way beyond the nature of the discussion at the time. but look, you can ask the prime minister about this. i think this is -- >> okay. can we then move on to the september, because in your diary the meeting of the 3rd of july, 2002, you say the u.s. had pretty much made up their minds. and geoff straw said the threat of wmd, iran, korea and libya

and iraq. iraq would be fourth. he does not have nukes,. [inaudible] and the tough question is whether this is just regime change, or is it issue of wmd? >> yep. >> and you say the that t.b. was pretty clear that we had to be with the americans. but had he by that time made up his mind, and had he already committed himself to president bush about joining? >> i think that within the -- if you look at the transatlantic relationship with, would the prime minister have said that that would fundamentally important to the analysis of the british national interests and strategic interests, yes, without a doubt. therefore, if he would have -- and, actually, i was going back to the operation desert fox there was similar discussions going on then about whether we should or should not be with the

americans at that time. the prime minister, i think, on these fundamental and strategic interest points his instinct and his leadership would say we should be with the americans. does not mean that you tailor your policy to suit theirs. no. and he shared the analysis, he shared the concern, he shared the objectives, we should disarmament of saddam hussein. hussein. >> did he share the means to that end? >> well, ultimately when it came to the invasion, clearly he did. but the whole way through, he was trying, if you like, he really believes, believed and still does believe that in these situations, you have to try exhaustively to go down the diplomatic route. but when you do with someone like saddam hussein you have to have the genuine strategy force

alongside it. and i think that sums up his approach the whole way through. again, christopher maher read to you from his speech that the prime minister made in 1998. and i think it sums up his position then and summed up his position the whole way through. saddam hussein was a genuine >> he was defiant year after year after year of the united nations. >> way. we know about that. what i'm trying to establish is at what point did tony blair commit to bush about regime change? >> he committed to -- and again, bear in mind, this is the prime minister, he is not doing this because of george bush wants to do it. this was his genuine belief, that iraq have to be confronted over its continued defiance of united nations and of its continued attempts to develop

this wmd program into fights of the u.n. that is his position. and that is a policy that he pursued the whole way through, right to the point of the house of commons vote, when you had -- you heard from mike boyce, you had mike boyce on the end of the telephone, write to that point the prime minister was hopeful that actually this thing could be resolved peacefully. right up to the point. the whole way through, understanding that if it did come to military action, if that became the only feasible route to go down, to make this disarmament happened, and he would want to persuade the cabinet and the country to commit forces to that. >> then i move on to the september 2002, when you accompany the prime minister to camp david for a further meeting with president bush. and i think you participated in a discussion, which was to build kind of international support

for action against iraq. what were the rationales discussed for regime change and four taken action against iraq at this meeting? >> well, i think that was one of the key moments of this whole -- this whole history, because as i think david told you, the prime minister really was being asked by the president to persuade his vice president that it really was a sensible thing to take this down to united nations would. and i think the prime minister really did make a difference in persuading both the president and vice president president -- >> i think -- >> that to my mind, the u.s. was the keypoint. >> i said what were the rationales discussed for regime change but what were the rationale for regime change?

>> the history -- i don't think this change. why it was iraq is such a issue at it is the history and the nature of the regime, and the threat and the context for the threat posed after september 11. i think it was the gchq paper that i hadn't seen at this time, but it had a threat of i think very, very good way of putting how the analysis, the context of the analysis change. so in a sense, it was, they were discussing the best way to take forward and try to work towards this objective of saddam hussein, and force him to face up under the u.n. i know you've heard from lots of different witnesses about the sense of tension within the american system, and there's no point in denying that they were there and they were real. tensions in any government. but what i think the significant of that meeting was that george

bush came out there and said we're going to the united nations and we're not going there to look for a pretense of military action. >> i want to come back to the question of rationale. there was a discussion about breakout session, i understand. threat of the region, wmd, and saddam's human rights record. >> all of those things were on the agenda of. >> but was it not the u.k. and the u.s.a. gave sort of different emphasis to these rationales? >> possibly. i mean, there was a sense, our only communication site, i had regular contact with my opposite numbers. so therefore, we were able to get a sense of where their public opinion was, our public opinion was. and they didn't feel the same sorts of pressures i don't think that we did.

they sort of -- we were very, very keen, all the time, to emphasize the importance of the u.n. the american attitude was, you all know, somewhat lukewarm towards the united nations, to put it mildly. given they had a democrat president and then a republican president whose policy was regime change, a kind of the there's the policy, you know, do it. i'm talking about their assessment to me of their public opinion. so was the emphasis different? yes, it probably was. but what i would like to say to you is, the prime minister didn't ultimately fundamentally share the view that saddam hussein had to be confronted and forced to face up to his obligations. >> so what you're saying, there were a fundamental agreements on the fact that saddam had to be dealt with, that's fine. and i mean, there were differences in terms of emphasis

because they were saying regime change. >> he stands up as is regime change. >> the point is did you and your colleagues explore with the american counterparts what the differences were and what the implications of these would be downstream? >> yes. gas. in fact, that was a very important part of the discussion, both in the margins and within the discussion. i can remember when there was a broader discussion and yes, i think it was a prime minister, president, vice president, condoleezza rice and i think that's where the prime minister to attend persuaded or at least got a tacit approval for the president from the vice president to go down that route. george bush, if you like picking our brains about this whole anti-americanism, and what our analysis for where it came from, how much, how real it was. so they were conscious i think of different strands of public

opinion. and i think back to the point of this being kind or three different bits of the government, i probably overstated, the white house, the state department, pentagon, all different places. but i think certainly the people i was dealing with and the prime minister's discussions with president bush, they got some of the broader political and issues attached to this. >> there was a lot of common ground and you did not explore in some depth for the differences of emphasis like and what that would mean in the longer-term? >> but in a sense, this was an issue that was being played out in the public domain all the time. so there was -- the difference in emphasis was evident for all to see. for example, later on in the process, i can remember when we

got onto the whole business of forgetting 1441, it is later the pursuit of the second resolution, that george bush was pretty clear that in terms of the pursuit of the second resolution it was very much for the u.k. interest. i think the difference of emphasis was pretty clear. >> okay. can i just also ask you about at camp david meeting, did you understand that the primus and the president having discussed what would happen after military action, if there would be one? >> yes, in fact, i saw going through my notes before crawford the meeting i mentioned, with mike boyce and some of the other military, and that discussion as well they were already talking about aftermath. >> day being -- >> us the british. and certainly in the discussions

i saw the prime minister had with president bush. it was always on the agenda. >> but mentioning it, but was there planning in terms of what that would involve and until? >> don't forget, at the time you a long way off, military action. and genuine, genuine attempt the prime minister is leading on behalf of the british government is to make sure this thing is resolved peacefully. so i don't know where, you have to ask people more directly involved in the planning than i was, when as it were, specific detail aftermath planning began. i don't know. but certainly everybody was conscious the whole way through this, that they would come a point, if they came to military action, there would come a point where the questions arose from that. i think people started thinking about those questions -- i couldn't say when the planning, they're always conscious. >> my understanding is the american view it would be all

right on the day. >> i read david mannix transcript to the inquiry, and i think there was a feeling of what he described as the neocon, if you like. there was that sends. that's correct. but i think there were others who didn't necessarily share that. so i think we did have a sense there was an awful lot of planning going on,. >> by whom they'll? >> the american administration. >> the aftermath of? >> yes. >> okay. now, can i come back to the question of the action against saddam, why did the u.k. focus its case on wmd? >> in all of these questions, there's never just one single thing. if you read the prime minister's -- i went back to the last few weeks when i knew, when i was going to be the inquiry. and i reread all the prime

minister, tony blair's speeches on iraq going way back. and there's a whole, a whole polity of arguments that were put there, why did the issue of wmd become so central, because that was what gave rise to the fear and the sense of the series, incredible threat to regional stability. and also, as i mentioned relation to september 11, the prime minister was absolutely and i think still is, seized of the view that unless the world is absolutely been totally vigilant on this issue, wmd, it's only a matter of time before something really terrible happens in relation to them linking with the terrorist groups. so that his mindset. i think you can disagree with it or not but that is what he was coming from. tranthirty, it was the regime

parts of it of course. would somebody like tony blair from the day he went to politics thank, got rid of, yes, he would have. was that the policy he was pursuing the whole way through? no. he was trying, through the u.n., leave the british government in the direction of pursuing a policy that would lead ultimately to this armament of saddam hussein. when he came to, the diplomatic process clearly was not going to resolve the issue, post 1441, and when the french pulled the plug, then military action became responsible. >> but you said earlier there was common ground, and of course, this is something that blair and bush shared. but we put emphasis on wmd. was it because the attorney general believes that the grounds for military action for a regime change self-defense, intervention, could not form a legal basis of military action? >> no, i don't think so. i can, i know the attorney

general will be here as well so he can answer about the legal questions. but that was not the argument, no. look, people can disagree with it or not, but tony blair held a fundamental deal about this being a real threat. the context of which was completely changed by september 11, and interestingly, again when i was preparing for this, i was reminded on a september 10, 2001, we went to lunch at the guardian, and reminded me post september 11 that at that luncheon on september 10, tony blair had said the really big issue coming down the track is wmd, slash road stay, slash terrorist organizations. the next day he had that view pretty firmly established -- 70. and from that moment, when he

gave evidence to the butler report it was the context that changed then, the containment which in any event was becoming less successful, people were getting, was more difficult to pursue, not necessarily having the effects that people wanted for it. out the tolerance level, if you like, of allowing saddam to carry on, defied united nations resolutions which he was in divines, that is what change. the context changed or that is a real security issue, and his judgment as the prime minister ultimately, that is why he is there and i am not. and other people aren't. he's got to make those big strategic judges based on what he knows that it was a genuinely held a strategic judgment about british security interest. >> i understand it, but privately he seems to be had a strong conviction about regime change. but publicly there was a policy to actually focus on wmd.

>> no. he had an absolutely fundamental to about -- look, as david manning reminded you, even george bush and i can remember a separate discussion, condoleezza rice, accepted that if saddam hussein did comply with the united nations obligations, if they had been able to say i've been there, i've seemed were all the leftovers are, i've been through the documents come we got all the paper, we've seen all the evidence, he's got it, that would have been regime change and it would have been a sort of different machine. so i don't accept, you seem to be wanting me to say that tony blair signed up to say, regardless of the back, regardless of wmd where going to get rid of the guy. it just was not like that. >> thank you. do you want to ask where to report breaking? >> yes. if i could follow up on one or two points. you i think talking about the

crawford press conference or quoting from the prime minister's press conference, crawford said, had him say, all the options available we will be considered. now can you recall from all of these meetings that were held on iraq in 2001, 2002, what meetings the prime minister did hold to consider all of the strategic options with regard to iraq and the likely consequences of each? >> how many meetings did the prime minister hold on iraq, dozens and dozens and dozens. if you were just talking about sitting down as it were for a fundamental review with all policy -- i would say that was happening on an ongoing basis. there were a number of really pretty big meetings with all the relevant ministers, and all the people that were feeding advice

to the process. so i think he and his colleagues were thinking about strategic options all the time. >> but what were those strategic options? >> well, when he talked about, when he taught there, post the crawford me about all the options being available, he's -- i go back to what i said in my previous answers, about the running together, if you like, of the diplomatic and military track and strategies aimed at ultimately into the disarmament of saddam hussein, which hopefully can be resolved diplomatically. but if they can't, then they're going to have to be resolved militarily. >> those are tactical options within a strategy. but you're not in a situation in which since 1991, containment had prevented iraq effectively from threatening its neighbors and from developing a nuclear

weapon. was that not an alternative strategic option? was that look at? >> yes, it was. there were discussions, i think again, you'd have to check the record but i think there was discussion of that as that crawford meeting as well. and certainly there was a discussion of it the first being the prime minister had with president bush shortly after president bush's election. and that discussion was happening with other leaders as well. clearly with the french, to the extent which the containment policy were not working. i think there was a sense it wasn't sustainable for the long-term. and i go back again to the point about what the jrc report, this threat, i think that had changed the nature of that argument. but all of these different options he would have been aware of them, he had been getting advice on them, thinking about them all the time.

>> there were times when perhaps even in a slightly formal way with cam and ministers and cds and other experts on the region, the finest would have sat down and said, here is the problem of iraq. what are the possible ways, possible strategies for dealing with it, and what's the downside of this, that any other as well as the outside? those discussions did take place. and the prime minister therefore was fully aware of the risks of going for a policy that might eventually lead to military action. >> and i would say passionate look, he's someone i think will always way up very candidly upside and downside of a particular course of action. and none of these decisions were straightforward. none of them were ever black and white, 100%, absolutely obvious, you couldn't see any other way of handling it. is always other ways of handling these issues, but ultimately he

has to make decisions. >> now, you said talking about regime change, that the prime minister was not saying that crawford that way now have a policy of regime change. but in his speech of the george bush presidential library immediately after the crawford meeting, to which you referred, he said, talking in general terms about terrorism and wmd, not just about iraq, if necessary, the action should be military, and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change. and he then went on, as you said, to refer to three conflicts involving regime change, also mentioned the taliban sierra leone, add a bit later on he talked about iraq. he said i know some fear precipitate action, the moment for decision on how to act is not yet with this. now, that language on regime change which sir christopher

mayer certainly regarded as a change of tack, you as intimidations expert, would you not feel that that was a clear indication that the prime minister was giving to the american people, he was speaking to the united states of his support for regime change and his readiness to apply it to iraq? >> i mean, i can't remember how the american media and public took that speech, but i don't see that as a significant shift. the speech that mr. vermeil are also referred to in 1998 -- christopher mayer, we have a long-term peace in the world to stop saddam -- >> can you so that they'll? >> sorry. we have a clear responsibility in the interest of long-term peace -- is in the record already.

-- and the point about the speech that george bush, presidential library, i don't think he is saying anything there that wasn't evident. >> but if you stand up in the united states of america, stand up in america in april 2002, when there's all this speculation about what's going to be done to iraq, and you say, if necessary the action should be military. and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change. how is the american audience going to interpret that? >> probably in the same way as they might have interpreted his speech in chicago. >> this is a different theory that iraq is not on the agenda with the middle east peace process and the arab-israeli conflict. the prime minister says that. is a signaling to the american people by saying that, that he supports regime change? >> what he signaling and i think what he says is we're going to try -- were absolutely determined to disarm saddam

hussein and we're going to force him to confront his obligations of the united nations and these resolutions that he is defied your in and year out. and where going to try to do that diplomatically, if that cannot be done, and the only way, the only way left is regime change through military action, then the british government will support the american government that if they do not message, -- >> that is the message. >> in my view that was not a seen a shift in his position. i accept the context is clearly different because of where we were in the iraq debate, the fact he is in america, i accept all that. whether or not it is a significant shift, is this a line that he didn't repeated back in the united kingdom? is a line he used in parliament at the time? >> look, if you're prime minister on an issue like this, and with mortifications than they are, any of you in this

room, -- >> that's not my question. the question is did this continue to be his line when he was addressing audiences in the united kingdom, including parliament? you are his director of communications. >> i thought that speech, and again, if you look at my diaries, i think i point out that the bulk of that speech was written before god to. there was a bit of fine-tuning. he knew what he was going to say. >> that's not the question i asked. >> what i'm saying to you is, the overall approach, was the same throughout. there were obviously most of which emphasis might change, there were key points at which there was a greater focus than other points that this may have been one of them but i think his system with the prime minister said. >> utah as you read all his speeches while preparing for this inquiry. did you find that he used that

line again after he used it at crawford when talking in the united kingdom, that he used it in parliament or in other speeches that? >> i he made clear, when he talked about, he kept saying conflict is not inevitable. disarmament is. but he was clear throughout that if the diplomatic route did not lead to disarmament, through saddam facing his obligations to the u.n. resolutions, then the military option was evident. so i really don't think that speech -- i know you asked jeremy greenstock did he receive specific instructions of a change and he said no, he didn't. i don't think there was any reason for him to do so. >> i wanted to ask about that point, too, not so much with regards to jeremy greenstock that you said you didn't accept the analysis, that there was a shift of policy at crawford that you disagreed with his evidence on that point. but was it not also documentary evidence, some of which indeed

leak into the newspapers that in march of 2002, as part of the preparations for crawford, sir david manning went to washington, with change instructions for what sir christopher described as a change in the instructions given to him, with regard to this very question of regime change, so there was an evolution at the time, was not there? or did you disagreed. he referred to sir david's visit, he said one of the main things that he was seeking to do, and this was new, an icon if you like, borrowed his instructions to do my side of things, was to say to the americans, quote, if you want to do regime change and if this is going to require military action, you guys are powerful enough to do it all on your own pic you can do it on your own. you have got the power to do it,

but if you're going to do this, and you want your friends and partners to join you, far better than that you should do it inside and analyze preferably taking the u.n. route. do you regard that as a change or an evolution or what? >> i think it's a different part of the timeframe. but i think there is consistent with the overall approach that i've been trying to set out to the problem is the overall approach is that ultimately there is going to be a disarmament. we're going to do our level best to get that done through the diplomatic route without a single shot being fired, but if push comes to shove, the diplomatic route fails, then britain would see it as responsibly to take part in military action. >> i just got two more points and then we're going to take a break, but arising from conversation that's far. on camp david, and more

generally, you said that we were very keen all along to emphasize the importance of the u.n. you also said the prime minister fundamentally shared the view that saddam hussein had to be confronted. that's a fair representation of what you said this morning. >> encoded as face with his obligations. . . say would fundamentally of the view that he had to be

confronted? whether without the united nations support? >> i thought it was interesting in the evidence where he made a telling point in the evidence about, but a philosophical discussions about what one united nations is a collection of the nation and in which you ended up with is of fundamental disagreements within the security council and the united nations. if they are mass had sent which eminent prime minister b nobody would say that. even the french were saying -- >> you still haven't answered my question. >> your question depends on there being a sing fell view defined as united nations view. >> there is a single view in the united nations security council adopt as position. >> right but if -- adopt position of the british government and american government didn't agree with. >> if the british government and american government were not able to get support of

united nations security council, the prime minister was prepared to go ahead without the united nations? >> ultimately when it came to terri action he believed that route, having persuaded george bush to take this issue to the united nations, having made clear in his view the united nations had to resolve the issue and not avoid the issue, through some extraordinary dip low tick work, jeremy greenstock, recent 1441 is unanimously agreed, when he came to the next step elements of the united nations, particularly the french, walked away from anything that might lead to their united nations authorizing military action. >> i think effectively answered my question. the final question, in these interactions with the white house, presumably the prime minister wrote to the

president bush from time to time, do you see that correspondence? >> yes. >> and, did he tell president bush in writing, during 2002, that he would support the president if he took military action? >> i think, i would certainly say the tenor of the, the prime minister wrote quite a lot of notes to the president and i would say that the tenor of them was that, as i said earlier, we share the analysis, we share the concern, we're absolutely with you making sure saddam hussein is faced up to his obligations and iraq is disarmed. if that can't be done diplomaticly, it was to be done militarily, britain will be there. that is definitely tenor of his communications with the president. >> without conditions? >> not a question being without conditions. because if you are saying that along that route, bear in mind -- >> let's not go away alochk the route. >> you ask me a question if

i can answer it. 12 years after the first resolution, six months after george bush takes it to the united nations four months after 1441 i think it was pretty measured and i think the prime minister was all the way threw trying to get resolved without a single shot being fired. in the end he is guy at top who has to make judgements with all the advice he gets how best to do that. that was his motivation right the way through. >> martin -- >> take a break? >> i think we need to take a break at this point. can you save it up until after the break? thank you. let's break now and come back at half past 11. >> thank you. >> welcome back, everyone. we'd like to pick up just a couple short points from the first part of the session, and about moving on. >> just a couple of points

in i may about these letters. second part i forgot. i like to make announcement by timing today. is clear already we're not going to be able to finish by lunchtime as i partly foresaw in opening. we will have be having a extension after lunch break, about an hour, restarting at 2:00. that is just for information. >> couple of points about the letters between the prime minister and president bush that you referred to before the break. were these letters, that would have been draft drafted by others, would they have been for example, seen by foreign secretary in draft before they were sent? >> he may have discussed, i think they were pretty private. dave manning, i suppose, his thinking may have emerged from meetings he had with others. as for drafts went around the system i pretty much

doubt it. >> did the prime minister write them himself? >> he did. >> who would have seen them after they were sent? you saw them. who else would have seen them. >> i don't know the short answer to that. certainly, jonathan powell. david manning would have seen them. others, i couldn't answer. >> foreign secretary? >> i would thought so, yeah. >> defense secretary? >> i think so. it would depend, i don't think he had seen part of the documentation that you have access to. i sometimes felt, talking about strategy, i sometimes felt they were quite advisory in stratstrategic terms. they were very frank. >> very frank and advisory. >> martin. >> you were speaking before

the break about the importance of the prime minister of the u.n. and primacy with regard our relations to the united states. can you tell us what discussions there were in the prime minister's circle after camp david about, what the u.k. would do in if the u.n. route failed? >> we're now in september. from my perspective, post-camp david, that was when real work on the september dossier really stepped up so i was very much engaged in that. i think, again, if you look at the statement, the prime minister made in the house, on the day of, publication, i think again, the message was very, very clear. this is about, informing the public about why we're

concerned. why that concern has grown. in relation to what the jic called, a step change in iraq's attitude and activities in 2001. obviously in context of september 11th. but also making clear that he, as a absolute believer in the internationalism and the united nations as a force for good in the world, that, it was a very, very tough message in there that iraq and, saddam hussein as well. >> was it not curious, to answer my question, that, there wasn't a discussion of what would happen if britain, having pursued this u.n. route, as the means for -- >> are you saying were there discussion? of course there were. i think, i couldn't tell you how many days or how many successive days the prime minister would have been holding meetings on iraq but it would have a very, very

large number. these questions were being raised and discussed all the time. >> what was the consensus or the view or the views as to what the u.k. would do if the u.n. route failed? >> i think, the position at that time was very much, as he said, publicly on a number of occasions. and that he said, right up to the point of the invasion, that, in his view, this was the best route to resolve this issue peacefully. he still believed right to the end, that could have been done. if saddam responded in a different way and some of the bigger powers of the united nations had responded in a different way as it were during just prior to, in march. and as to, i think he had a genuine fear as well if the united nations did not resolve this issue and was not seen to stand up for what has been calling for

over such long period of time, there was potential damage to the flighted nations as well. this may seem counter to what, conventional wisdom on this although i thought it was interesting, jeremy stock seemed to be making a similar point, there was a challenge the whole time with that he was saying to the united nations. you've gone on for so long, or we, the united nations have gone on for so long stating publicly again and again what he has to do and he doesn't do it. we know he doesn't do it. there is diplomatic, very occasionally there is the kind of operation there was in 1998. but actually saddam hussein is effectively getting away with it the whole way through. >> damaged to the united nations doesn't resolve the issue is going to do. >> what britain does then, i think again, is i think the

prime minister's credit this happened in the way that it did. despite the terrible divisions there were, they were pretty profound at the time, in part because he had so aggressively and so pursuing the united nations route and emphasizing importance of the united nations, actually united nations were able to get involved in the aftermath more quickly ad they otherwise been down to the united states. in his mind, part of the argument here is how is the united nations going to rewilled these relationships -- rebuild these relationships in the aftermath of an invasion should that be necessary. >> the subtext or square bracket united nations route failed, britain and united states would have to take military action? >> i think once 1441 was agreed and once the french had failed to get 1441 to

say what they wanted to say, then i think that is obvious logical conclusion. >> not before, that was not discussed before? >> no. no. >> all right. >> thank you. i'm going to take you through the dossier, september -- >> can i speak one point to clarification. was asking about the discussion of sanctions and said it was camp david it was not camp david we were talking about at the time. september 2001, they were discussing colin powell was about to go to the region and they were discussing possible changes to fly zones. >> much earlier no-fly zones. that specific discussion was much earlier. thank you. >> the dossier air. >> why was a dossier air seemed to be necessary in

necessary in 2002? >> the dossier was seemed to be necessary because the prime minister had been growing more and more concerned in part because of the intelligence that he was seeing over a period of time. i mentioned a moment ago what the jic call this step change. and i think, post--september the 11th he was growing more concerned. with even senior politicians he was having the argument, if you saw what i saw you wouldn't be asking me all these questions. of course what he saw was material that really only he and a number of other senior ministers able to see. i think, this partly relates i suppose to the discussion we had earlier about the way the media and political culture has changed. there was a time, when i was a journalist, if my predecessor on downing street said, is some story

going around about intelligence. we never comment about intelligence matters. that was more or less the line and people accepted that. that was it. that is just no longer, no longer tellable. so what he wanted to do, and i think really think it is a shame in a way that the, that the controversy that's subsequently followed about the dossier is, was a as tns as it was. exercise in openness and much more open government and trying to share with the public information really quite sensitive. when she is trying to share with the public so they can be informed about all the factors going into his, into the decision-making process. that was thinking behind it. >> there was a political context as well. in your diary for the third of september, you say, we went through of the hard questions on iraq. the hardest was why now?

why was what we knew now that we didn't before wasn't that made us believe what we have to do now. >> yeah. >> so it was about setting policy as well, not just revealing helpful intelligence? >> it was also at time, this was again how things looked so differently in the sense of benefit of hindsight. at the time, i don't know if you remember, but over the summer holiday, over the august period, i mean, up till then things had been relatively quam. then i think it was jim baker and brent scowcroft made a couple of pretty high-profile interventions in the american debate, if you like, state department, side of thement. and the neocons really cranked it up. and, by, cheney and rumsfeld were out making, and their people were out making some pretty neocon type statements. and part of the thinking, when the prime minister came

back from his summer break and then we went to i think it was mow sam and sustainable development conference in south africa and we decided to have a press conference and he where he said we would bring forth the process on the dossier. part of that was actually trying to calm the situation. he made the point i think in the, in the september the third press conference at sendfield, no decisions have been taken. the conflict is not inevitable. people are getting ahead of themselves. what he did want to do, set out for the public in as accessible a way as possible the reasons why he become more concerned. >> so, very much depended on the newness of the information, the revelatory nature of document? >> partly yeah, not wholly but partly. >> just again, another bit of context the meeting you had a few days later in camp

david, you had been discussing the where the question of presentation became big issue between, you discussed it with dan bartlett, your opposite member in the white house as well. >> yeah. >> was there a sense of needing to influence each others, the american debate as well as the british debate? >> i think, as i said earlier i think american opinion was in a different position. but, on these big global issues -- >> you mentioned the neocon -- >> i was interested in, chris meyer's evidence as he said about going around the states not being terribly supportive of administration. i didn't have that impression. i thought that was quite interesting. i think that we certainly, it wasn't a question of trying to influence them, them influence us but we were aware our

communications had an impact on their positions and even more so, i suppose their communications had an impact on ours. to be fair to the dan bartlett and karen hughes and these people they were always very up for being told very, very frankly where sometimes their communications didn't help out at all. so we did have a source of discussions. >> now, we now move to the actually production of the dossier. this wasn't the first time the issue of a dossier had come up? >> no. >> so there had been two papers prepared -- mr. black. >> i will check. [inaudible] >> more like with the chairman and new manager, but. >> but, there have been two papers beforehand.

there had been one prepared by the jic in march 2002, is that correct? >> yes. >> march or february. >> it was past the 21st of march. >> right. >> why was it decided not to use that paper there? >> i think that the, that kind of work, i suppose is being done all the time in terms of them making assessments. i suppose the axis of evil put in mind all the countries that people might be, might be focusing upon. >> but you lacked a different paper. is this -- >> four country. >> four country one of february 2002. which did look at the. >> yeah. >> so i am happy to talk about that because that is important the reasons you just given. so carry on. >> as i recall it, there was a paper prepared within the

jic process as it were, of course the four countries, decided, just really put to one side, not for any great reason other than the fact that it didn't it, wasn't the sort of thing that bass, that was going to be in any way put in the public domain at that time. no rhyme or reason for it to have been done so at that time. then work began on ira iraq-specific. >> have been one reason past the caution on february 2002 one is that by looking at, iran, libya, north korea, as well as iraq, it would have brought home the fact we've heard in evidence from those other countries were actually further advanced and of greater concern in of nuclear weapons in particular than iraq. >> yeah. i think that is why, i think when you talked about those questions, you read from my diaries in september when we

were up in sedgefield, why iraq was a very, very important question as well. and i think were tony blair here, what he would say to that the reason why he was more concerned about iraq, was partly because they produced chemical weapons. partly because of the nature of the regime and history of the regime is important, in this. and also because there was no, even the semblance of being able to get any sort of dialogue with him at all. >> but for the moment, there wasn't a particularly good political reason why to, produce something. highlighted significance of those other parts in february. then in march there was a, a paper on iraq that was confirmed by the jic, and passed on to number 10 on 21st of march. which i think covered some of the ground but i think it was decided no the to go

ahead with that? >> yeah. >> why not in march? >> again, this is, just, i can't claim to remember every part of the thought process or decision-making process, but i think at the time, it was sense that actually, ramp up an issue, particularly didn't want ramped up. >> so you were happy to ramp it up in september. in april, i'm not sure if this was before or after crawford, counter deliberation department at foreign office was asked to prepare a paper on history of inspections. and that led in june to a document that was entitled briefing papers on iraq. do you recall that? >> i don't recall being involved in that process. -- was involved in that. >> point is by september, there were, two potential departments or, agencies

that might produce a dossier. >> yeah. >> one would be the foreign office, and one would be the jic. >> yep. >> were both making bids? >> i don't think the jic as it were, making bids, making a bid. i think there was a feeling in the foreign office this should be their product. now the prime minister woos absolutely -- was absolutely clear and was about it as well, and john scarlet was of the view, john used year, intelligence base of it he wanted to be 100%, in charge of that process. and that's something that, i think it is fair to say that the there were people wrn the foreign office ownership

and we had to make it very, very clear that was not going to happen. >> one much your answers to sir roderic lyne, it was your opinion that intelligence agency got communications better than others. could you expand a bit on what you meant by that? >> that wasn't a criticism of foreign office. what i meant by that, as i talked earlier about, rather silo-driven department by department communications has to go to the back of the queue. you have ministers, and policy officials and they do all the, really important stuff. and then bring in the communications guy at the end and they all sort of write a press release and that is kind of it. that was the sort of basic approach. i mean i exaggerate to make the point but not that much. what i think, what i was talking about in relation to, in particular some of these big international crisis moments, that the there is

an understanding, the media will follow them, report them, present them to the public. can actually have an impact upon what they have to do on the ground militarily and intelligence community as well. >> so you had a degree of confidence that the, that jic, understood the media context in which they were operating? so you wouldn't be taking them wholly into unknown territory? >> what, i would step back a little bit from that first of all, i think the reason why, forget my view. only reason why prime minister was so, supportive of the idea of them being in the driving seat on this is because he felt that, i go back to the points i made earlier. him saying if you could see what the intelligence people are showing to me you might actually have different take on this you see why i was becoming more concerned. what he wanted to do in a sense put in public domain

this is what they're presenting to me. so actually the whole strength, if you like of that document, in its public communications and presentation and parliament terms wasn't it being a jic document. >> on, 5th of september you chaired two meetings in the cabinet office with seen officials including john scarlett to discuss the dossier. >> yep. >> why were you chairing these meetings. >> because john scarlett, having done, he considered to be a pretty advanced draft of the dossier, then, said to me, i think quite rightly, this is, this is to be a document the problem presents to parcel lent. -- parliament. there is massive global expectations around it and i need a bit of presentation or support and that's what i gave him. >> you said that scarlett already had done a draft. i didn't think the had been

done. >> talking about, there came a point where he said i have not reached a point where i need presentation and advice on this. we met on the 5th. as a result of those meetings, a process was set out by me in writing around the system, which made clear, what the dossier in terms of its overall structure and contents were going to be but also emphasizing to everybody in the system this was now john scarlett's work and anything that had gone before was redundant and irrelevant. when he came back to me it was to say i have now reached a position where i need presentation advice. i was chairing those meetings because the prime minister was going to be presenting the paper that john was working on to parliament, massive media interest right around the world and i think it was entirely not inappropriate but necessary that i should have done that. >> but most organizations chairing a meeting confers authority and accountability. basically you're saying you're the custodian of this

process as well help with this presentation? >> i mean, in terms of, the, just, point of accuracy the meetings were in downing street, not cabinet office. the, within the context of that meeting, i was the person who was charged by the prime minister to advise him on all the presentation aspects to do with the dossier and his production was going to be enormous. i think on the day that we, the dossier was published the w s and interest was absolutely huge. and so, john's role within that which was clearly understood by everybody, and i think also in a way it hopefully was assistance john scarlett and the jic, that, in a sense we were so clearly having that relationship because, to the rest of government, it was sending very, very clear the message, this is now, the document that the prime minister is going to present

to document, and john scarlett, is man in charge of it. >> but it was quite unusual and -- >> i accept that. >> there wasn't precedent for you chairing a meeting of intelligence professionals, with intelligence professionals present? >> there had been meetings i had before where intelligence people would have been there. because they had, legitimate, and, appropriate advise to give to me about presentational and communications issues. >> you sent around a memo afterwards which indicated main headings to be covered, the importance of this being, jic product and john scarlett would be happy with it. there were two additional points. you drew attention to the fact that the inevitably will be focused on what's new. and, you, expressed pleasure

that the intelligence community was going to take a healthy approach in going through their material. what did you have in mind there? >> what i had in mind there, there were these reporting, reports in parts of media of rumblings within the intelligence community and throughout the process john scarlett, richard dearlove and others made absolutely clear senior positions within the agencies and jic that was not attitude at all and they understood why the prime minister wanted to present this in the way he intended to. >> was it helpful approach going through material, mean looking for material that perhaps hadn't seen the light of day before that might help to make an impact? >> it was making sure that all of the, the material that the prime minister might be referring to when he's saying, i'm seeing more and more intelligence which makes me more and more concerned about iraq as a

threat, that that was considered in the dossier a air. -- dossier. >> second you said a dream was being established to present the document in presentational point of view include john williams from the foreign office which was to make recommendations. how did this team work during the production of the dossier air. >> when i said the inquiry there were all sorts of people putting in comments and suggestions they were perfectly entitled to do that, i was in a sense involving all the people within my own, within the number 10 operation also people in the foreign office and elsewhere who, when it came to the presentation of the dossier, which is several times there is going to be pretty major communications event, that they were fully brought into the process as well. so they were able to make comments and it was entirely

up to in terms of any redrafting, it was entirely up to john scarlett and his teams whether they took any notice or not. >> but they were sitting in on some of the drafting meetings?. >> i don't think i ever went -- >> i don't about you did. >> again i wouldn't necessarily be aware of all the different meetings john scarlett, and julian miller and his team might have been having, but certainly this was a very, very significant piece of communications. as you said, we had al qaeda document using some intelligence material before, on this scale, nothing like it had had ever been done before. my colleagues at number 10 and those in the foreign office they had a legitimate interest in understanding the preparation of this but the whole way through it could not have been made clearer to everybody that nothing will override the intelligence judgements and john scarlett was the person,

if you like had single pen. >> but people, approaching from a memo to the prime minister to john scarlett, 4th of june, 2003, he said that, with the agreement of edge sis and representatives from number 10, downing press office john williams. paul hampton, were involved. so this was they were quite actively engaged in the discussions? >> making clear to the prime minister this is going through all the people he probably expected to take a look. this is document that he is going to present to parliament. >> can we just clarify the role of mr. williams. since the report the document has been released of the draft prepared by him, his press secretary in the foreign office. now, some people have described this as a first draft of the dossier. would you say that was fair?

>> no. well, as i understand it, i don't recall ever seeing it. doesn't mean i didn't but i don't recall ever seeing it. i think that was john, you would have to ask john williams this i can't recall whether he was asked about is at the hutton inquiry, but that was john williams in a sense putting what i think is described as a front piece to the one of the papers that you referred to that had been produced within the jic earlier. once we got to september the fifth and september the 9th it was anything that had been written before frankly was, to be used by john scarlett as he saw fit but i did not see that as draft. >> when sir john scarlett passed you first draft on 10th of september, you referred to considerable help from john williams, so, he -- >> can i just emphasize for the sake, not remotely criticizing john williams in this.

he was totally and legitimately wanting to help in terms of the building the arguments, in terms of, making sure that all presentational aspects were right. but there came a point within the process, i remember at one point jack straw phoned me up, obviously wrote very, very closely with the foreign secretary, jack again, very, very helpful, if you want john williams full-time on this, writing it, then he's there. in that spirit that was being offer of the not as it was a weir trying to grab this thing away from the jic. >> okay. when this first draft was distributed, which john scarlett had drawn on all the available intelligence identified so far, the response from some of the people, on the presentational side, was a bit disappointed.

there's an e-mail string of 11th of september, starts with daniel pruce. play up more the nature of intelligence forcing. mr. smith at pm, saying it is a bit of a muddle did. needs a lot more clarity. then it comes to phil bassett, i think worked for you. >> he was special advise prime minister. >> agreed it should be less legal tick. he complained it is intelligence-light. feels like this is the least possible intelligence material that the intel people are prepared to let go. despite the fact that we say it is everything the government knows on this issue which it clearly isn't. now, this would feeling of presentational team couldn't be the intelligence material was so thin? >> that may have been their, honestly-held opinions but i didn't agree with them.

i actually thought that the paper that john scarlett produced on, september 10 was, it certainly had, i thought was a very, very good piece of work. so, as i said at the hutton inquiry they're all perfectly titled to make those points that is their opinion. but ultimately it would not be their decision what went in or the what the overall structure of -- >> rather it is in terms of being concerned about making maximum impact. >> yeah. >> if this was their reaction, -- >> i think that is relevant. and i think it is interesting of course when, when, the prime minister wrote a note to, i think it was one of his monday morning notes that i referred to earlier. and he said, on the dossier, the expectations must be right. i dated it, it says,

remember the case we need to make is for the return of a tough inspection regime, not the that he is about to launch a strike. now if people were expecting a document that said, you know, we're all going sitting, carrying in our homes because the saddam hussein is about to launch of off nuclear weapons that was not what was being said. and therefore, again, at the butler report pointed out when the dossier itself was published lots of media said it was dull, nothing much new but we never wanted it to be anything other than setting out the, people talk about being a case of war. it was not the case of war. it was the case why the prime minister had been become more concerned. if somebody in the press office thought it wasn't this, wasn't that, fine. i thought it was very, serious, solid piece of work. >> it is not just a question of the nature of the threat it is presenting because, as you said this wasn't

necessarily a threat assessment. it was assessment of evidence. >> yeah. >> but it was a sense, you could say they were assuming that what they were seeing was the tip of an iceberg in terms of intelligence recall material but actually there was nothing over water. this is all there was. what they were drawing attention to the problem, whatever the message the intelligence on what seemed to be based which had been shown in that draft was thin? >> well, they're entitled to that view but i didn't share it. >> but, on that evening of the 11th of september you met with john scarlett. and after that meeting, a note went around reporting, i guess on your views. it says, it states that number 10, through the chairman, wanted document to be strong as possible within the bounds of the available intelligence. so this is -- more to be

done. looking for material. >> it was a process like there is in any such publication where, as i that was point which john came to me, said, look, i need presentational advice and support in this and that's what i gave. but i think as john scarlett also made clear, many, many times, that the hutton inquiry, at no time did i ever ask him to beef up, over any of the judgements that he had and so forth. so it was, once more, i think that, the jicked this document to be as, as, wanted this be to as strong and complete as possible as well. >> one of the problems that comes into focus, you're taking intelligence community, which in its normal workings is tentative, very cautious, these are fine deof probability with which you use to qualify its

judgements and the world which you're involved, which is, much more definite, geared to the news cycle and so on, bringing these two into line is bound to affect the some way that intelligence, normal intelligence product would be presented. >> well i'm not sure about that. look, is it the normal stuff of intelligence office's work to be engaged in that kind of production? no. but, they weren't really normal times. you were in a situation on this particular policy, as it evolved and developed, this did become, prime minister, the prime minister, he's conscious of the fact that he's got incredibly difficult and serious decision he is going to have to make series, set of decisions he is going to have to make as this process evolves. i think he was just in a

position of to say, well, here i am. i see this intelligence. i am, becoming more and more concerned we are going going to have to face up to this and we're going to have to deal with it. we're going to have to stop turning a blind i eye to it and he stopped sharing that with the public. once he made the decision as prime minister and ultimate head of intelligence services as well, where i sit i have to do my part of that, the job that follows from and they have to do it. but at no point did anybody from the prime minister down say to anybody within intelligence services, look, you've got to sort tailor it to fit this argument that never happened. >> but the pressure is on, if john -- you're trying to make a case. we've heard sir hillary norman who stressed how careful were officials were to indicate that intelligence were sporadic,

patchy, limited. 9th of september estimates which mentioned in the dossier was based says intelligence remains limited. so there is a problem here. that you want a strong case but it has to be based on limited evidence. >> well, all i can say is that document, that was presented to parliament by the prime minister, was, it was a jic document with the prime minister's forward upon it. and i think that the, if that had been the view, that, so when the prime minister said in the forward what he believed the intelligence said, that is what he believed the intelligence said because to john sawyer's tell tense to he believed what he had been told, why shouldn't he. in a sense i don't really, i don't believe that the dossier in any sense

misrepresented the position. i think it was cautious. everybody involved in it was aware of the unprecedented nature of it. and, for that, in part because of that, took great care handling of it. look, let's be absolutely frank. i don't think we would be having this exchange if it was not, with the controversy subsequently ensued which i dare say, not of my doing. >> i'm not talking about the controversy which subsequently ensued. this was the major case that was made at the time for the basis for stepping up of policies. >> which was hans blix himself said, it set out the case for tougher -- >> it was about making case how to work with the intelligence that was available. >> yeah. >> now, just, you mentioned the previous inquiries that

looked at this. lord hutton suggested jic might have been quote, subconsciously influenced to make wording of the dossier stronger than it would have been contained normal jic assessment. do you accept that might have happened? >> no, i don't because of the nature of john scarlett. i don't accept that at all a. i can see why lord hutton might say that but i can say from where i sat, seeing how john scarlett and his team approached that task but every task i ever saw them involved in, i don't accept that, no. >> butler committee, more weight was placed on intelligence than can bar the dossier give impression theres with fuller and firmer intelligence behind the judge thaent -- judgment than was the case? >> all i can say, repeat myself. when the prime minister, not just my exchange with john scarlett but also with his

own, was absolutely clear, they, the jic had to be happy with that document and in terms of its emphasis, let me also, again because people know, are not remotely suggesting you, but last parts media routinely rewrite the history around this, i think it was presented to parliament was if you like, cautious side of things. he said in terms, intelligence can't give you whole picture. intelligence isn't necessarily going to be right but intelligence that he saw, both in terms of, and as it was explained to him and as he had repeated discussions and meetings about it, it led him to the conclusion, as he set out in the forward, that he did believe it was established beyond a doubt that saddam continued to produce chemical and logical weapons, that he continued to develop nuclear weapons and he has been able to extend range of his ballistic program and sees wmd as essential to -- >> we'll come on in a moment

to some of the particular judgements that made. i want to conclude this section. you've described a process in which the intelligence agencies and through the jic are keen to do their best to get evidence into the public domain in a serious way possible. they understand the policy context. you told us how john scarlett is regularly attending policy meetings. these are not questions for you, but it is an issue that they're being drawn into helping make a case and that they want to help. they want to serve the government as much as you do. therefore it is not necessarily that surprising as lord hutton put it, there was subconscious desire to things beyond which they might normally go.

>> you say that but i think the relationship that john scarlet has with the prime minister and the respect that the prime minister had for john scarlett and his integrity and his commitment, his professionalism, that, you have to ask john scarlett, i don't accept that he would felt under that pressure. if john scarlett felt the intelligence doesn't really bear the argument that you want to present in parliament, prime minister would have just accepted that. but the reason why we got to this place in the first place, in this process in the first place because the prime minister had become more and more concerned about the against that he was seeing. >> can we now turn to the question of the forward. did you draft this? >> yeah. i think what happened, a meeting at which, this would often be the case, which the prime minister would give me

a verbal draft. he would tell me what he wanted to say within the forward. i would go away and, write something. then i would show that to people within the system before going back to him. so i, again, i can't remember every step of the process but that would probably be -- i remember, as it were, the meeting which he said, look this is what the forward, should say. he was very comfortable with the sort of lines that you came up. almost certainly would have rewritten them and draft gone around the system and people would have made comments in the normal way and ultimately he would sign ofed off on the final version. >> master john told us he forward something quite separate from the text of the dossier itself. it was political statement signed by the prime minister and therefore, not something he felt he would change. >> he did change it though.

>> he changed it a bit on the reference to the jic. >> i think what happened the forward, i think went to john and was copied to all members of the jic. any one of them, any one of them had a concern, about aspect of it i know for a fact the prime minister would have taken that on board. so i think john scarlett made a number of small suggestions. all of which were taken on board. and, i understand what he says, what he means by that, he's, forward by the prime minister which in a sense was in part the basis for the prime minister's statement to parliament as well. in a very high-profile, pretty politically charged by then context. sir john scarlet saying quite rightly this is bit of work i've done. if john scarlet or any of his team had any concerns of

real substance about the forward than they know they could have raised those directly with the prime minister. >> when we take the sentence, what i believe the assessment established beyond doubt that saddam continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, nobody challenged the beyond doubt. >> no. >> written a note to us that intelligence does not have this certainty attached to it. >> if there is general, going back to the point you made earlier, general philosophical point that was a fair point to make. the prime minister presenting this to parliament and say if you like he is in no doubt based upon the fact that the intelligence people have briefed him, clear, that this is a -- >> beyond doubt sounds like beyond anybody's doubt. >> yeah but, at that time if you had spoken to the, out to french intelligence service or german intelligence service or even countries ultimately did not go with the united states and u.k. and the other allies in this, nobody was really saying that saddam

hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction and that he wasn't a potential threat with them. >> we can argue about, very strong phrase. without doubt. >> this is why -- >> it supports the view that a case has been made that is refootable. >> okay. would is interest been that weakened those two words not been there? probably not. in a sense what the document did was it set out a pretty broad-ranging case and you have the history. if you go to the, i repeat the point i made earlier that was noted in the butler report about the i can't commentary at the time. this was pretty conservative. it was very cautious. there was nothing terribly explosive about it. the reports who provoked the controversy later actually said, there is nothing new in this. we've known all this for

years. and, sort of what we can, more i can say about that other than, because i can't remember every part of every discussion about it but i think that what we were doing, as i say was making a case, as to why the government, why the prime minister had grown much, much more concerned about this as as serious, credible and current threat. >> do you think it was sensible to incorporate the forward into the document in the way that it did because it did suggest jic was endorsing forward? indeed the process you -- because it is moving jic into policy. >> the prime minister is going along to parliament and standing up making a statement which is basically contents of the forward and he was going to be saying it was all based upon this there is not that much difference between that. it was going to be put into the political and public arena on a global basis.

now that, you can argue, as to whether thatment should never have been taken but i go back to the point i made earlier about the changing nature of the media landscape and political landscape the fact that people no longer are just prepared to say if the prime minister says it is intelligence, yeah, okay, prime minister, we'll buy that, that's fine. >> lauren can i intervene. i want to establish one point. this is regarding sir john scarlett and indeed others ability to raise points the text of the forward. >> yeah. >> sir john told us that he saw the forward as something -- of the dossier, and that is not disputed but he also, told us that it was, in his judgment, an overtly political statement, yes. signed by the prime minister and not something therefore he could change. and dez monday bowan in his,

said much the same thing. they had the opportunity to intervene. they could. but they didn't because they felt they couldn't. >> i don't -- i agree with that. >> i'm not disagreeing, i'm not going to say, anything remotely critical of about john scarlett who i have huge regard but i don't believe that had any of the jic thought the forward in any sense overstated the case to a degree that would make the work they had done hurt its credibility, either they didn't feel they had the opportunity to say something or indeed they wouldn't have done. i think as i said to you earlier, albeit they were quite minor changes the jic did make changes. not as if they say that text there is sacrosanct, we can't touch it. >> can i follow up the point

one more. there were two references to doubt in the forward. one is, the prime minister saying i'm in no doubt of a threat is current and serious. fine. but it also says, what i believe the assessed intelligence has established to be beyond doubt. not fine? >> not fine? >> not fine, because assessed intelligence never establishes anything beyond doubt. question. >> the prime minister presenting this document to parliament and him saying, what he believes it tells him. i also, that, you know i have been in meetings that, john scarlett and other intelligence officials, and, if that what they were saying, yes it is. >> just, finally on the forward, jonathan powell

early nothing do demonstrate a threat, let alone a imminent threat from saddam. you replied why saying tb's forward sets out case i'm making. the import of the forward it turns a intelligence assessment to a threat assessment? >> no. we were never saying this was a saddam hussein was about to, you know, do something terrible to the british main land and, that wasn't what we were saying. i don't think the -- >> but it can be a threat? >> the forward, the forward, was, really never, anything other than the prime minister, yes, putting his stamp on this document, and also on the debate that was going to flow from it. and it was the, it was, i suppose the basis for some of the arguments he then set out in parliament. but i don't like accept that

it changed the, as it were, made it something different in the forward. >> made it something different in the sense it drew the policy implications for it. >> prime minister, that is in part what he is there for. >> in the first draft of the dossier it stated the case i make not that saddam could launch nuclear attack on london or another part of the u.k., he could not which reinforces point you just made. >> yeah. >> then that sentence was removed for the final draft. >> again, no idea. why specifically but he made a very, very similar point in parliament. so, you be aware of this, but things get drafted and redrafted and written and rewritten. but there was no significant strategical policy reason why that sentence shouldn't be there. >> let me go to the nuclear issue. seems what we looked out on

presentational side, there was concern, particularly about the feeling of material -- >> not by me and not by the prime minister more importantly. >> in our confirmed that the nuclear issue was manageable, saddam so long as sanctions were in place. >> yeah. >> on the 10th september draft it noted that with sanctions in place, iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. >> yeah. >> without sanctions it would take five years. they conclude from this the time scale would shorten if iraq succeeded in obtaining fissile materiel from abroad. taken directly from the jic i believe. so basically the line that has been taken here, put it this way, iraqis knew how to cook but lacked ingredients. as long as sanctions were in place they wouldn't get the ingredients. if sanctions were removed it could would take them five